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CAUSES
FOR THE
COLLAPSE
OF THE
CONFEDERACY

Jesse Colchamiro
History 106
March. 30, 1931

THIS BOOK
IS
DEDICATED
TO THE
LIBRARY OF LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY
TO SERVE AS
A RELIC AND REMEMBRANCE
OF THE
FIRST COURSE
IN THE
"CIVIL WAR and RECONSTRUCTION"
GIVEN IN THE
FALL SEMESTER OF 1930
by
PROFESSOR CHARLES M. THOMAS
IN
LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY
DURING ITS PERIOD
OF
ADOLESCENCE AND GROWTH

PREFACE

I have written this book for the purpose of filling a distinct gap in the field of historical writing. The research worker in the field, "Why the Confederacy Failed", will find that he must spend hours and hours of his time searching for material on this subject. It seems that there has been consistent attempt among present-day writers to avoid coming out into the open, so to speak, and enumerate specifically just what caused the Confederacy to fail. It is to fill the above-mentioned gap that I have undertaken this thesis.

I should also like to remind the reader that he will find no bibliography better or more complete on the subject than the one found in this book--especially in reference to the primary sources; If the reader finds fault with the book, let him remember that it is my bibliography that I wish to contribute to the shelves of historical literature rather than the material itself. Since this thesis is based wholly upon the writings of others, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to all the writers mentioned in my bibliography. I also wish to express my indebtedness to Mr. Thomas of Long Island University, without whose aid and advice, I would never have been able to persevere through my venture; to several of my classmates who have given me valuable advice in their field of research; and especially to my sisters who have cheerfully undertaken the difficult task of typing this thesis.

J. C.

March, 1931

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CAUSES FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONFEDERACY

PART ONE

OUTLINE

Part I
Outline
Causes For The Collapse of The Confederacy

Part I Introduction

A Importance of Subject

1. As a study of past events (Historically)
2. As an aid to the prevention of a similar catastrophe

B Procedure

1. Presentation of opinion of others
2. Comments of my own after each presentation

Part II Causes For the Collapse

Chapter I: Political Causes

Section A: Failure to obtain Foreign Aid

1. Causes
 - a. The defeat of cotton by corn
 - b. The cultivation of cotton in other countries
 - c. The brilliant diplomacy of the Northern Statesmen
 - d. The hatred of slavery in Europe
 - e. The fear of the consequences of a war
2. Results
 - a. The blockade
 - b. Downfall of the Confederacy

Section B: Internal Dissentions

1. Causes
 - a. States Rights vs. Centralization
 - b. Exemption
 - c. Conscription
 - d. Impressment
2. Results
 - a. Loss of faith in government
 - b. Downfall of the Confederacy

Chapter II: Military Causes

Section A: Naval Blockade

2. Causes
 - a. ~~Lack of Foreign Recognition~~
 - b. Lack of Confederate navy
2. Results
 - a. Aided federal army
 - b. Prevented supplies to Confederacy
 - c. Prevented finances to Confederacy
 - d. Downfall of Confederacy

Section B: Lack of Supplies

1. Causes
 - a. Blockade
 - b. Lack of transportation facilities
 - c. Impressment policy
 - d. Administrative inefficiency
2. Results
 - a. Loss of spirit among the soldiers and people
 - b. Desertion
 - c. Discontent
 - d. Downfall of the Confederacy

Section C: Desertion

1. Causes

- a. Suffering from lack of supplies
- b. Anxiety for families
- c. Lack of pay
- d. Lack of motive in fighting
- e. Weariness of war
- f. Lack of strict disciplining in army
- g. Prevalent belief in exemption of rich

2. Results

- a. Lack of soldiers for fighting purposes
- b. Lack of soldiers for protective purposes
- c. Broke spirit of army and people
- d. Downfall of Confederacy

Section D: Inefficient Organization of the Army

1. Causes

- a. Military elections detrimental to discipline
- b. Law permitting "substitutes"
- c. Exemption laws
- d. Employment of negro soldiers
- e. Policy of dispersion
- f. Neglect of cavalry

2. Results

- a. Lack of discipline
- b. Dissension within army
- c. Desertion
- d. Downfall of Confederacy

Chapter III: Financial and Economic Causes

Section A: Inflation of Paper Money

1. Causes

- a. Blockade
- b. Lack of Specie in the Treasury
- c. Futility of Taxation

2. Were financial troubles caused by a lack of foresight?

- a. As viewed by writers
- b. As viewed by author

3. Results

- a. Decline in value of money
- b. Rise of prices
- c. Speculation
- d. Starvation among people and army
- e. Loss of confidence in government
- f. Downfall of Confederacy

Section B: Economic Inferiority of the South

1. Causes

- a. The South was agricultural
- b. Slavery causes immigration to flow northward

2. Results

- a. Inferiority in fighting men
- b. Inferiority in military resources
- c. Inferiority in transportation facilities
- d. Inferiority in economic development
- e. Inferiority in wealth
- f. Downfall of Confederacy

Chapter IV: Social and Psychological Causes

Section A: Loss of Morale among soldiers

1. Causes
 - a. Suffering
 - b. Despondency
 - c. Fear for those left at home
 - d. Constant defeat
 - e. Hopelessness of foreign aid
2. Results
 - a. Desertion
 - b. Collapse of Confederacy

Section B: Loss of Morale among people

1. Causes
 - a. Suffering
 - b. Despondency
 - c. Constant defeat
 - d. Hopelessness of foreign aid
 - e. Disintegration of the social life
2. Results
 - a. Opposition to government
 - b. Collapse of the Confederacy

Section C: Conclusion

CAUSES FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONFEDERACY.

PART ONE

"WHY THE CONFEDERACY FAILED"

PART 1

INTRODUCTION

As the reader knows, it is deemed unethical if the writer of a new historical treatise proceeds to place his thoughts on paper without giving some reason for his addition to the already innumerable mass of historical writings. Therefore, in order to keep within the circle of "historical etiquette", I ask the reader to bear with me while I point out the significance of the subject. The first question that enters one's mind is the following: Why should we study the causes for the failure of the Confederacy? The reader may argue that the Confederacy failed exactly sixty-six years ago; and therefore its study would be fruitless and benefit only those of a musty and antiquarian frame of mind. However, there are two good reasons for the existence of this paper: (1) that it is a matter of historical importance, which means that a student of history must understand this phase if he is to appreciate the results of this memorable collapse; and (2), which is the more important, that we often profit from the mistakes of others. Here, I wish to present a beautiful exposition of the latter point written by Duncan Rose, the son of a confederate officer.

He says: 1

But it is asked, "What doth it profit us to inquire into this? Anybody can criticize. Hindsight is better than foresights. It is not so easy to do as to know what had

been good to do. Wherefore, then, seek to know why the Confederacy failed?"

All of which is very true. The study of the past would be profitless if it were indulged in only for the pleasure of finding fault. But we must keep in mind that it is history only that can furnish us a guide to the future, and that it is only by the study of the mistakes and successes of others who have gone before us that we can know how we should act under like circumstances.

Thus, we realize that the perusal of this treatise should not be undertaken merely to satisfy one's curiosity; but instead, to be studied for the sake of its value.

Now, I believe it would be wise if I spent a few moments discussing the method that I shall follow in the writing of this book. As the reader knows historical subjects sometimes produce contraversial points--especially a subject like the Causes for the Collapse of the Confederacy. In view of this fact I shall in my presentation place before the reader quotations from different authors followed by comments of my own. In this manner, I shall place the burden of authority upon the shoulders of those whom I quote; but the reader should keep in mind that I expect to take all the responsibility for the comments which will follow the quotations.

The reader will also notice that I have departed from the "conservative" method of inserting quotations. For the sake of clearness and convenience, I have omitted the formal quotation marks, and have placed each quotation in a separate paragraph in single space. But enough for the introduction; let us proceed!

PART TWO

CAUSES
FOR THE
COLLAPSE
OF THE
CONFEDERACY

CAUSES FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONFEDERACYChapter 1POLITICAL CAUSES

Before we proceed to study and analyze the different causes that led to the downfall of the Confederacy, we must remember that each cause was not a distinct entity wholly unrelated to the other factors. Therefore, even though I must break up the different factors for the sake of clearness and convenience, the reader should remember that each "cause" is closely related and very dependent on the other "causes." As one writer puts it: 1.

;but I think it is as difficult to assign brief and general reasons for its failure as it would be to say why A has beaten B in a long and closely contested game of chess. Probably during forty moves B might have won by different play, and each move of the forty might be called the fatal one.

With this significant point in mind, let us analyze what I would call one of the most important causes for the downfall of the Confederacy--namely, the Failure to obtain Foreign Aid. Bear it in mind, however, that this statement does not imply that fact that the Confederacy with foreign aid would have won the war, although this is very probable; but that without foreign aid there was very very little hope for victory.

E. P. Alexander, Brigadier-General of Artillery C. S. A.
1. Century Mag. Volume 53--Feb. 1897, Pg. 629.

We find Jefferson Davis saying:1.

Mr. Mason became our representative in London, Mr. Slidell in Paris, Mr. Rost in Spain, and Mr. Mann in Belgium. They performed with energy and skill the positions, but were unsuccessful in obtaining our recognition as an independent power.

This merely tells us that the Confederacy was not recognized, but the important question which confronts one's mind is: Why did the European Power fail to recognize the rebellious south? From all indications in the year 1861, the observer would say that foreign intervention was only a matter of time. Let us diagnose the thoughts of the southerners at this period. In Beard's "Rise of American Civilization," we find the following comment:2.

"I firmly believe," exclaimed Senator Hammond of South Carolina in the year of secession, "that the slave-holding South is now the controlling power of the world; that no other power would face us in hostility. Cotton, rice, tobacco, and naval stores command the world; and we have the sense to know it and are sufficiently teutonic to carry it out successfully. The North with us would be a motherless calf, bleating about, and die of mange and starvation."

This quotation gives us a picture of the thoughts of the legislature; now let us turn to the average citizen. In the "War Diary of a Union Woman in the South," we find the following scene described: 3.

Jan. 28, Monday (1861)

Rob opened the battle yesterday morning by saying to me in his most aggressive manner, "G., I believe these are your sentiments;" and then he read aloud an article from the "Journal des Debats" expressing in rather contemptuous terms the fact that France will follow the policy of non-intervention. When I answered: "Well, what do you expect?"

1. Jefferson Davis, "Rise and Fall of Confederate Gov't", Vol.2,pg.368
2. Beard, "Rise of American Civilization", Vol.2, pg. 55
3. War Diary of a Union Woman in the South.
Century Mag. Oct.-1889-pg. 931
Century Articles on the Civil War-Vol. 5

- This is not their quarrel," he raved at me, ending by a declaration that he would willingly pay my passage to foreign parts if I would like to go. "Rob", said his father, "keep cool; don't let that threat excite you. Cotton is king. Just wait till they feel the pinch a little; their tone will change".

We see from the foregoing illustrations that the people were very optimistic as to their chances for success. Nor can we blame them, for cotton was a very much desired commodity; and the southerners believed that they would force the foreign powers to intervene in their behalf by prohibiting the export of cotton. The fact remains that the shortage of cotton did cause a great deal of trouble and hardship to the people of England and France; enough to warrant intervention if the countries so desired. Looking through the books on the Civil War, one may find many descriptions of the suffering and misery caused by the shortage of cotton. Jefferson Davis tells us that:1.

The foreign necessity for our cotton is represented in these words of her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on May 6, 1862, when speaking of the blockade of our ports:

"Thousands are now obliged to resort to the poor rates for subsistence, owing to this blockade, yet her Majesty's Government have not sought to take advantage of the obvious imperfections of this blockade, in order to declare it ineffective. They have, to the loss and detriment of the British nation, scrupulously observed the duties of Great Britian to a friendly state."

James Ford Rhodes' description of the effects of the cotton shortage is even more vivid and striking. He says: 2.

Mills were working short time; manufacturers were reducing wages; mill owners and laborers were dismayed at the prospect of a cotton famine. The blockade stood between them and a supply of cotton, threatening the owners with business derangement, and the workmen with starvation.

1. Jefferson Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederacy", Vol. 2, pg. 343
2. James Ford Rhodes, "History of Civil War 1861-65", pg. 66

Thus we see that there was much hardship in England. Now, let us turn to France. In Armistead C. Gordon's book we find the following discription: 1.

Next to England, France suffered most from the famine; consuming as she did 240,000,000 pounds annually, as against a thousand millions in England and 364,000,000 in America. Practically all of the French supply was American. When this was suddenly cut off, 300,000 people in one district were made absolutely destitute, subsisting according to report, "by roaming at night from house to house, and demanding rather than asking alms," while at Rowen, out of 50,000 operatives, 30,000 were "laid off" and in the surrounding country only one-fifth of the handweavers had work.

We may say then without any contradiction that there was a great deal of suffering occasioned by the shortage of cotton. If so, then the question which immediately confronts one is this: Why did the foreign powers abstain from recognizing the Confederacy? The reader must remember that no one can dogmatically point to this or to that specific cause and state that it was responsible for the fact that the Confederacy was not recognized..What we can do, however, is to analyze as critically as possible all the different reasons given by writers and then attempt to determine what seems to us to be the most important cause.

A very interesting point now confronts us, namely, the fact that England and France were often upon the verge of recognizing the Confederacy. J. B. Jones tells us in his diaryt that in August 4, 1863 the outlook for the southern side was indeed bright:2.

Nevertheless, most men look for relief in the foreign complications the United States are falling into. England will not prohibit the selling of steamers to the Confederate States, and the United States say that it shall not be done; and France has taken possession of Mexico.----- We think recognition of our government is not far behind these events;-----.

We also find that in September 24, 1864 Palmerston wrote the following letter to Gladstone:3.

1. Armistead C. Gordon, "Jefferson Davis"pg. 165
2. Jones, "A rebel War Clerk's Diary" vol.2, pg. 5

It seems to Russell and me that the times are fast approaching when some joint offer of mediation by England, France and Russia if she would be a party to it, might be made with some prospect of success to the combatants in North America, and Russell is going to instruct Cowley to a private letter to sound the French Government as to their willingness to agree to such a measure if formally proposed to them. Of course, no actual step to such effect could be taken without the sanction of the Cabinet. But if I am not mistaken, you would be inclined to approve such a course.

If it is true that the foreign powers were often on the verge of interfering or recognizing the Confederacy, we realize then that to find the exact reason for their inaction will be a much more difficult task than if conditions had been otherwise. The questions that come to one's mind are: Was "King Cotton" not the real "king"? Did the Confederate representatives bungle up affairs? Was the foreign situation not conducive toward interference? What, then, kept the foreign powers from openly recognizing the Confederacy?

There are several different points of view concerning the answer to this question: Some writers state that cotton was not the real "king" notwithstanding all indications to the contrary. They give two reasons for the fact that cotton was dethroned-- first, that there was enough cotton in the foreign countries to carry them through the war; and second, that the desire for wheat ~~eeeten~~ produced by the North superceded the desire for cotton produced by the South. Let us now examine the writings of the different authors in this field. Edwin Sparks tells us that:²

Some cotton reached Europe by "blockade runners"; the United States Government exported still more; and a new

3. Meyer Frustadt (classmate), "Foreign Affairs during the Civil War" Part 1--pg. 4
 2. Edwin Erle Sparks, "The United States of America", Part 2--pg. 263

source of supply was found chiefly in India.----- The cotton famine of Europe, so fully expected by the seceding states, failed to come. "King Cotton" proved to be a fallible monarch, and one of the strongest hopes of the Confederacy was dashed.

We also learn of the same fact from Armistead C. Gordon who tells us that the southern ports held by the north were opened to trade to relieve the cotton shortage: 1.

Relief ensued, after the close of 1862, as a consequence of the method which the Federal Government adopted of continuing the blockade. Military and naval expeditions invaded southern ports where cotton and other valuable products were stored, or from which the territories of their production were accessible. New Orleans, Beaufort, and Port Royal were occupied ~~off~~ by Federal forces, and were officially declared by the United States Government to be open for trade. Licenses for trading with these ports were granted to foreign vessels by Federal consuls,-----; while circulars were addresses to the foreign ministers at Washington, announcing the reopening of communication with all conquered southern localities.

Other writers such as Edward Channing² and Roland G. Usher, whom I will quote soon, emphasize the fact that the failure of the wheat crop in Europe during this period created a desire among the foreign powers to continue on friendly relations with the North in order to obtain its wheat--in other words, "Old King Cotton's dead and buried: brave young corn is King".! Other reasons given for non-intervention are: the brilliant diplomacy of the northern representatives, the fact that the south was fighting for the continuance of Slavery-- and institution disliked by the common classes of Europe, and the fear that recognition and intervention would bring on a disastrous war with the north. From the Cyclopaedia of Political Science, we read: 2.

1. Armistead C. Gordon, "Jefferson Davis", pg. 165

2. Channing, vol. 6, pg. 340

Belligerent rights were accorded to it (Confederate) by the leading powers, but it was never recognized as a government, notwithstanding the persevering efforts of its agents near the principal courts. This result was mainly due to the diplomacy of the federal secretary of state, Wm. H. Seward, to the proclamations of emancipation in 1862-3, which secured the sympathy of the best elements of Great Britain and France for the federal government, and to obstinate persistence of the federal government in avoiding, so far as possible, any recognition of the existence, even de facto, of a confederate government.¹

While Alexander Johnston emphasizes the effects of the diplomacy of Seward and the proclamations of emancipation in 1862-3 leading to non-recognition, we find still another laying emphasis on the effect of slavery. Jacob D. Cox's² opinion is that:

-----except for the fact that the system of slavery was in conflict with the public opinion of the civilized world, there would seem to be little doubt that both France and England would have intervened actively in behalf of the Confederacy.

However, there is another side to this question. Just as the authors mentioned above tend to lay stress on the political and ethical aspects of the problem, so does Roland G. Usher place emphasis upon the economic side of the question. I am quoting him in full because it is the most detailed and scholarly account that I have found dealing with the reasons given for the neutrality of Great Britain and France. He says: ³.

The expectations entertained by the South of assistance from England and France did not materialize, chiefly because cotton was not king. While large and influential sections of the English people favored the Southern cause, the government was loath to act until the ability of the Southern Confederacy to maintain itself was apparent.

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1. Alexander Johnston--"The Confederate States" Cyclopaedia of Political Science--Vol. 1 - Pg. 566
 2. Jacob D. Cox--Major General U.S.V. "Why the Confederacy Failed" The Century Magazine: Vol. 53: Feb. 1897 :Pg. 633
 3. Roland G. Usher Ph.D.--"The Rise of the Am. People"--A philosophical Interpretation of Am. History Pg.32
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Unquestionably, too, the sagacity and ability of C. F. Adams, the United States Ambassador to Great Britain, was instrumental in preventing prompt action in favor of the South, and in delaying a decision until both England and France concluded, as the Confederate agents were compelled to report, that the probabilities of the restoration of the Union outweighed "the wisdom, energy, and completeness" of the administrative system established at Richmond. The expected pressure upon foreign governments caused by the need for cotton was long postponed, because, in the spring of 1861, the European manufacturers had nearly a year's supply of cotton on hand. Long before this supply was exhausted, the general failure of the grain crops throughout Europe caused a demand for food-stuffs literally unprecedented since the Napoleonic wars. England, even then unable to feed herself and dependent on importation, found her usual sources of supply either non-existent or inadequate and was forced to seek some new supply of food. In that very year of European scarcity, the West harvested the largest crops of its history; the new railroads quickly and cheaply landed the crop at New York; whence it was shipped to England and found ready sale. The North possessed in fact the only available supply of a commodity which Europe needed far more than it did cotton. The lack of cotton as a medium of exchange with Europe was scarcely felt. The Emancipation Proclamation,-----, seems to have played an important part in deciding the European nations to decline to recognize the Confederacy. -----All hope of recognition was destroyed by the victories of Vicksburg and Gettysburg.

We have at this time completed a survey of several reasons given by different writers for the failure of the foreign powers to intervene actively in behalf of the Confederacy--the fact that "King Cotton" was dethroned by "brave young Corn;" the fact that enough cotton was obtained by the European countries to carry them through the period of conflict; the brilliant diplomacy of Seward and the American representatives abroad; and the fact that the South was fighting to preserve slavery--an institution hated by the common classes in England and France. There is however another possible reason which I believe is the most important one, namely, the fact that England and France feared that recognition and intervention would re-

in a war with the North whose effects would be far more disastrous to their welfare and industry than the effect from remaining in a state of neutrality. Samuel A. Goddard in a letter dated Jan. 21, 1864 sent to the Editor of the "Daily Post" from England states after considerable study that:¹.

It has been admitted on all sides, even the Times has agreed in it, that recognition means intervention, and intervention means war; and consequently, if this be so, the movement in question is not only designed to reverse the declared policy of the Government, as approved by a large majority in the House of Commons, but to involve the nation in a war that would probably be more disastrous to commercial and industrial pursuits, and to universal morality, than any other on record.

The foregoing quotation is the opinion of an American who had studied the situation abroad, but now let us turn to the feelings of the very newspapers themselves. We find that the "London Times" of Sept. 5, 1861 and the "London Shipping Gazette" of Sept. 6, 1861 expressing the same opinion:².

But the truth is they (the Confederacy) think they hold the supply of Europe in their hands and may turn the power they possess to political advantage. They think if they starve Liverpool and Havre and all the factories dependent on these markets they will force England and France to come to terms and either break the blockade or recognize the Confederacy. We, and our neighbors across the channel, may suffer from a shortage of cotton, but we are not going to involve ourselves in a naval war with the Northern States in which it is very doubtful if we shall have co-operation of France.

Thus, we see that the English mind realized the disastrous results that would follow if a war broke out. Another factor which kept the European powers from interfering was the ominous presence of a Russian fleet in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

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1. Samuel A. Goddard -- "Letters on the American Revolution" 1860-1865; Pg. 400
 2. John Bach McMaster -- "A History of the People of the U.S. during Lincoln's Administration" Pg. 128, 129
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One of the most disclosing accounts of this incident is found in "The Journal of Modern History " of December 1930. E. A. Adamev tells us that:¹.

On September 11 (1863) a Russian squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral Popov, and on September 24 another under the command of Rear-Admiral Lesovsky, appeared, the former in San Francisco and the latter in New York, "with alleged sealed instruction," remarks the most recent American writer, (F.L.Shuman, "American Policy Towards Russia since 1917" (New York, 1928)), "to assist the Union should Great Britian and France take hostile action----"The content, and even the existence, of the 'sealed instructions' remains doubtful. But in the United States the visits were hailed with grateful rejoicing as a clear indication that ~~at~~ least one Power of Europe, and that one old friend was prepared to stand by the Union."

That the fear of a war with the North and possibly with Russia was no doubt one of the causes for the fact that the foreign powers remained in a state of neutrality. Meyer Friistadt who has done quite some research on the "Foreign Relations of the United States during the Civil War" tells us that:².

It must be understood that the Cotton Issue was magnified many times its original size. While the other factors, such as sentiment, the press ridiculing the situation in America, the question of investments in America and, the general feeling against war, decided heavily against the European open aid to the South.

Whether the fact that the "Cotton Issue was magnified many times "is true or not I do not care to discuss, but the statement that there was a "general feeling against war" is, I believe, true. Although I leave to the reader the privelege of judging what he believes is the most important factor which determined the passive policy of the foreign governments, and although I personally

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1. E.A.Adamov---"Russia and the U.S. at the Time of the Civil War"
The Journal of Modern History-December 1930
Volume 11--No.4--Pg. 586
 2. Meyer Friistadt--"Foreign Relations"--Pg.5
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tend to emphasize the fear of the results of a war with the North and Russia, we may nevertheless safely conclude with the statement that the foreign powers were kept from actively interfering in behalf of the Confederacy because of the influence exerted by the combination of all the above-mentioned factors--the fact that "King Cotton" was dethroned by "brave young Corn;" the fact that enough cotton was obtained by the European countries to carry them through the period of conflict; the brilliant diplomacy of Seward and the American representatives abroad; the fact that the South was fighting for the preservation of slavery, an institution hated by the common classes in England and France; and lastly, the fact that the European powers feared the disastrous consequences of a war with the North.

Although there is a difference of opinion among different writers as to the most important factor which led to non-intervention by the foreign powers, we nevertheless find no such difference of opinion when we search for facts dealing with the results of the pacific policy followed by England and France. Writers agree that the Confederacy could never have come out of the conflict successfully without active foreign intervention. Don Carlos Buell states that:¹

There was from the first but one reasonable chance for the survival of the Confederacy, and that lay in foreign intervention. Recognition alone would not have availed.

Jacob D. Cox is of the same opinion. He says:²

But this non-intervention made possible the great blockade

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1. Don Carlos Buell--Major Gen. U.S.V.--"Why the Confederacy Failed" Century Magazine--Vol. 53--P.631--Feb. 1897
 2. Jacob D. Cox--U.S.V.--"Why the Confederacy Failed"--Cent. Mag. Vol. 53--P.633--Feb. 1897
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of two thousand miles of sea-coast, depriving the Confederacy of a foreign commerce which was a vital factor both in marketing her own products and in procuring munitions of war.

Even Lord Napier, a Frenchman, realized rather early the hopelessness of further conflict on the part of the South with foreign intervention. E. A. Adamov tells us that:¹

On May 13 (1863) Lord Napier wrote to London that "the revolt is spreading in the hope of foreign intervention. If the English government do not mean to fight, let them say so, and stop the loss of life and the suffering attendant on a rising which, unaided, cannot succeed."

Therefore we realize that the lack of foreign intervention, caused by a combination of different factors varying in importance, was one of the most important causes for the collapse of the Confederacy.

Before we proceed to another phase of this topic, I should like to make the reader familiar with a fact of more interest than importance. Owing to the fact that most writers of this phase of history failed to deal with the countries other than England and France, the average readers are left with the impression that no foreign power ever recognized the Confederacy. If we can call the Papacy in 1863 a foreign power, we realize that this impression is a false one, for Albert Bushnell Hart tells us:²

----; and great was the jubilation when, on the 3d of December, 1863, Pope Pius IX addressed a letter to that illustris et honorabilis vir, Jefferson Davis, which was construed by the Confederacy into a recognition by a foreign potentate,--the only recognition which it ever received.

So with this unimportant but rather interesting detail, I conclude

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1. E.A.Adamov--"Russia and the U.S. at the time of the Civil War"
Journal of Mod. Hist. :Dec. 1930 :Vol. 2 :Pg.591
 2. Albert Bushnell Hart--"Why the South Was Defeated in the
Civil War"--New England Magazine :Vol. 11 :Pg.364

my dissertation on the causes and results of the failure of foreign intervention; and pass on to another of the political causes which resulted in the collapse of the Confederacy, namely, the dissensions within the Confederacy itself, which I shall term the internal dissensions.

Just as we find quarrels going on in ~~many~~ a family, so do we find quarrels and dissensions in the family of the Confederacy --only much more vehement and disastrous. Albert Bushnell Hart puts it rather mildly when he says:¹.

The internal workings of the Confederate government were by no means smooth. Almost from the beginning there was in Congress an organized opposition to President Davis.

A true description of the situation would be a statement to the effect that the opposition was very strong, that in some instances it assumed the proportions of a rebellion, and in one case--a rather humorous case, which I shall describe later--there was actual secession within the Confederacy. As we proceed to a further study of this phase of history, we learn that there was dissension in the cabinet, in the legislature, and, the most severe, in the states. A detailed and clear account of this topic, well-worthy of being quoted in full, comes from the pen of William E. Dodd:².

A curious, though common, American policy of the Confederate president, supported by the states, did much to weaken the new government. The first Cabinet was composed of men who either had opposed the secession movement or who had been rivals of Jefferson Davis for years. Vice-President Stephens had never been on friendly terms with Davis and he had been the most powerful opponent of secession in the South as

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1. Albert Bushnell Hart--"Why the South Was Defeated"--New England Magazine--V. 11--Pg. 372
 2. William E. Dodd--"Cyclopedia of American Government"--Vol.1 Pgs. 372-374
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late as January, 1861; Toombs was hostile to Davis, while Memminger of the treasury department had consistently fought the separatist movement since 1832; L. Pope Walker had been a leader of the unionist forces of North Alabama-----. In the senate and house a large minority--sometimes a majority--of the leaders was made up of men who had never believed in the wisdom of secession, though most of them acknowledged the right of a state to withdraw from the Union-----. This is one of the causes still cited in South Carolina for the failure of the Confederacy; certainly it produced much dissatisfaction, and discontent was a primary cause of the final overthrow.

Speaking of dissension outside the Capital, he continues:

In the same way the "war governors" frequently overstepped the boundaries of their authority. From the beginning the governors of Georgia, Tennessee and North Carolina treated with contempt many of the perfectly regular demands of the Confederate Government. At times this amounted to open violations of law. And from November, 1864, to February, 1865, a strong party in the Confederate congress led by Alexander H. Stephens and supported by Governors Vance of North Carolina, and Brown of Georgia, urged the impeachment of Jefferson Davis and the establishment of a military dictatorship with General Lee at the head. The refusal of the latter to countenance the plan alone prevented a practical attempt at its realization.

We see from this account then that the dissension within the Confederacy was a matter of grave importance; it assumed the proportions of rebellion and treason. From the pen of another author we learn that this often unwarranted criticism tended to undermine the faith of the people in the government--thus making the already difficult task of continuing the rebellion all the more difficult. Colonel Robert Tansill of the late Confederate States Army tells us that:¹.

Even as early as the second year of the war, as its hardships began to be more sensibly felt, and success not appearing so certain, a factious spirit was manifested towards the Government in different parts of the country, particularly in North Carolina and Georgia-----. They did everything in their power to discourage the citizens, and to bring defeat

1. Robert Tansill --"Causes Which Led to the Failure of the Confederate States"--Pg. 12

upon the Confederate arms.----- In 1863-'4, this party had so increased by desertions from the army and accessions from the citizens, that it was really formidable. In North Carolina, they adopted the name of "Conservatives," ----- They denounced the Confederacy as a despotism, and proclaimed in their newspapers that it was a "rich man's war and a poor man's fights."

The internal dissension was indeed a very important factor in the failure of the Confederacy. The question that confronts one's mind at the present moment is: What were the causes for this internal dissension? In attempting to answer this question we come across one of the most interesting and most important problems that ever troubled the race of mankind. History abounds with examples of this very serious but rather comical feature of human nature, namely, the fact that a person who fights for a certain privilege usually refuses, when he gets into power, to extend this privilege to others. The Puritans fled from their homes for the sake of enjoying the right to worship as they pleased, but when they once ascended to power, they refused to grant this privilege to others; when the Confederate leaders fought for the principle of "States Rights" and organized their own government, they refused to accord full "States Rights" to the rebellious states. Thus we come to the realization that the secession of the Southern States did not end the career of that parasitic-like argument of "States Rights Vs. Centralization" which was one of the causes for internal dissension. John C. Schwab enlarges on this point when he says:¹

But the state authorities of Georgia continued to oppose the centralizing tendencies which were yielding up their

1. John Christopher Schwab--"The Confederate States of America"
Pgs. 208, 209.

autonomy to the growing military despotism in Richmond. They were much encouraged in this by the attitude taken by such men as Vice-President Stephens and Senator Toombs, and found a ready mouthpiece in their Governor, who persistently upheld the rights of the State which we thought were being violated by the growing power of the President. In a letter dated April 18, 1864, the Vice-President, though disclaiming any feeling of personal opposition to President Davis, strongly expresses the conviction that the letter is aiming at dictatorial powers, and that he has signally departed from his former States rights views.

Another cause for complaint against the Central Government of the Confederacy was the laws regulating Exemption and Conscription. The common classes believed that the laws which tended to exempt the wealthy class from military service were unfair and this provided another source of irritation. This was especially true of Western North Carolina where the planter with twenty slaves was exempt, and where the slave holders were in the minority.² Although the ethical aspects of this problem--that is, whether or not the Exemption Laws worked only for the interests of the wealthy classess--do not come within the scope of this thesis, and because I fear that some reader may be left with the impression that the beliefs of the people were always well-founded, I feel it my duty to make a few comments concerning this subject. John C. Schwab tells us that:²

These liberal exemptions were further extended on October 11, 1862, so as to include one white overseer for every twenty negroes on a plantation, --- a provision thought necessary to guard against the withdrawal of whites from the country districts, and to insure the largest production of food products.

So we see that many of these laws were enacted for the welfare of the state. However, the fact remains that no matter whether a belief is true or not; if it tends to influence people in their actions, it is important and should be, by all means, mentioned in

1. John C. Schwab--"Confederate States"--Pg. 201.

2. John C. Schwab--"Confederate States"--Pg. 196, 197

a historical essay. But to continue! We find that the hatred against conscription was even more intense; and in 1863 and 1864, public meetings were held in North Carolina protesting vigorously against the "military despotism",¹. or as another writer put it, this "arbitrary infringement of the liberty of individual."². Still another grievance of the people lay in the impressment policy of the Government. The following quotation³. admirably sums up this troublesome but inevitable situation.

The Confederate impressment laws aggravated the burdens of the war. They not only lessened the available supply of food by discouraging its being brought to market, but what agricultural products did reach the towns and cities were constantly in danger of impressment, and were often seized for government use at a price far below the market rate. This practice accentuated the scarcity of food products, created destitution in some sections, raised prices still further, and stimulated the bitterest feelings against the military authorities, especially for interfering with goods on their way to market.

The internal dissension which grew out of the above-discussed grievances--"States Rights vs. Centralization," Exemption, Conscription, and Impressment--was another of the causes which led to the collapse of the Southern Rebellion.

While we are on this topic, I believe it is interesting to note what writers say of the relation between Jefferson Davis and the southern people. One writer in particular is of the opinion that Jefferson Davis was hated by the people because they made no attempt to aid him when he was "captured" by the Northern Government. This is what Samuel A. Goddard says in a letter written in July 4, 1865 to the Editor of the

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1. John C. Schwab--"Confederate States"--Pg. 201
 2. Roland G. Usher--"Rise of American People"--Pg. 329
 3. John C. Schwab--"Confederate States"--Pg. 207, 208.
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Daily Post:¹.

The ultimate fate of Jefferson Davis was foreseen soon after the war began. His unscrupulous aggressiveness would make him feared, but his despotism would cause him to be hated, and his conceit and arrogance would cause him to be despised. Since his fall, not a line has been written in the whole South in his favor; not a hand was held out to assist him to escape. Traversing a district where his rule had been held supreme, he was arrested by a few horsemen, and taken some hundred and fifty miles through the same district, without any attempt being made to release him. Not a lamentation for his fall has arisen from any quarter, and not a single petition for his pardon has come to the President except from Unionists. Could anything be more conclusive of the disfavour in which he is held by his former "subjects."

I believe that the reasoning of this writer is not very logical. It is true that a good many people hated President Davis for one reason or another--the inevitable consequence of being in power--but to say that the fact that no southerner made overture to the Government for the release of Jefferson Davis is an indication of the popular hatred, is very illogical because there may have been other reasons--the most important being the prevalent notion that the Government would give no quarter to the Southerners. The reader should bear in mind that the entire South was not hostile to Jefferson Davis even though writers may emphasize the internal dissension.²

Another point of interest, worth being mentioned, and which is discussed only by one writer in a magazine article, is the startling statement that there was actual secession within the Confederacy. In 1862, we find that in what was formerly the territory of the "United States," there was actually three nations--the "United States," the "Confederate

1. Samuel A. Goddard--"Letters on the American Rebellion"
--Pg. 527.

2. This is my personal impression.

States of America," and the great and illustrious "Sovereign Nation of Jones County" formerly of the State of Mississippi, with its own president, cabinet, congress, etc. Perhaps this is the origin of "miniature golf?" This comical affair is described by Albert Bushnell Hart:¹.

A much more amusing case is that of Jones County, Mississippi. The 3,300 people of the county became tired of the burden of the Civil War, and by a convention held in 1862 formally seceded from the state and Confederacy.

"Whereas the State of Mississippi, for reasons which appear justifiable, has seen fit to withdraw from the Federal Union, and whereas we, the citizens of Jones County, claim the same right, thinking our grievances are sufficient by reason of an unjust law passed by the Confederate States of America, forcing us to go to distant parts, etc., etc. Therefore, be it resolved, that we sever the union heretofore existing between Jones County and the State of Mississippi, and proclaim our Independence of the said State, and of the Confederate States of America--and we solemnly call upon Almighty God to witness and bless the act."

Thus we see that the two political causes mentioned above --I call them political for the sake of classification and clarity--namely, the Internal Dissension and the Failure to Obtain Foreign Aid, were instrumental in causing the people to lose faith in the Confederacy and thus precipitate its collapse. I now ask the reader to turn to another group of causes which I shall designate as the "Military Causes."

1. Albert B. Hart--"Why the South was Defeated." New England Magazine: V. 11: Pg. 363.

CAUSES FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONFEDERACYCHAPTER 11MILITARY CAUSES

Just as the political causes described in chapter one were important in causing the downfall of the Confederacy, so were the military causes; and of the latter type of causes, the most important was the Federal Blockade. There is no disagreement among writers that the blockade was one of the most important factors in the collapse of the Confederacy. It "bottled up" the entire South and made defeat only a matter of time, for the South had no means other than foreign aid to replenish its "energy." A modern analogy would be a situation similar to this: a fighter cornered with his back to the wall and with no means of escaping being continually pounded and pounded and pounded by a heavier opponent until he dropped from sheer exhaustion. True, the South fought hard and with a spirit that deserves much commendation, but it was not match for the North which was vastly superior both in resources and ability to replenish its supplies almost at will. So we may say without any fear of contradiction that the blockade was one of the most important factors in sapping the strength of the South and leading to its final overthrow. Let us now turn to the writings of the different authors and see just how they expressed their feelings on this subject. I believe that the reader can never obtain the true realization of the immense effectiveness of this blockade unless he reads

some accounts of the different writers. From the pen of John Fiske, we read that:¹.

In a still wider sense it is true that but for the navy and its gallant commander it would have been impossible to put down the rebellion. The work done by the navy was truly Titanic.----- Yet with a few months this stupendous blockade was made effective. It isolated the Confederacy from all the rest of the world, and made its overthrow possible.

From the pen of still another author,² we obtain the same impression.

The operations of the Federal fleet contributed as effectively, though not as obviously, as did those of the army to the overthrow of the Confederacy. The blockade forced an economic isolation upon the South which weakened her power of resistance. Her resources were much inferior to those of the North, and owing to the blockade, they could not be effectively employed. The paper-money policy undoubtedly also contributed to that end, and sapped the industrial strength of the Confederacy. The Civil War represented for the South a conflict with overwhelming odds. The South contained a population only about half as large as that of the North. It had no large trade centres, except New Orleans and Charleston; and the more important of these two cities came into the possession of the Federal authorities a year after the opening of hostilities. The South had no manufactures comparable with the enormous industrial resources of the North; and its railway system was inferior. That the war lasted as long as it did was due to the brilliant generalship of the Southern military leaders, pre-eminently of General Lee, and to the heroic efforts made by a devoted people to avoid the inevitable result.

While speaking of the federal blockade, Roland G. Usher very appropriately terms it, "Uncle Sam's webbed feet." In his discussion, he substantiates the findings of the authors quoted above. He states:³.

Meanwhile, the expectation that the South would be able to buy in Europe with King Cotton nearly if not quite everything she would require also was crushed by the totally unexpected efficiency of the blockade of Southern ports established by the Northern Navy.----- In fact,

1. John Fiske--"The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War"--Pg. 108-9.

2. John C. Schwab--"The South During the War"--The Cambridge Mod.

History--Vol. VII--Pg. 621

3. Roland G. Usher--"The Rise of the American Navy" Pg. 328

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the only system of transportation, which the South had consistently used between plantations or with the outside world, fell into the hands of her enemies. The normal intercourse with Europe ceased even before hostilities were begun in earnest; by the summer of 1861 the South was already finding it difficult to procure lead, medicines, salt, and other necessities.-----
----. On the whole, it is no exaggeration to say that the blockade was so soon effective that the South was compelled to fight the War from her own resources, plus the very considerable supplies of all kinds on hand in May 1861.

Thus, the reader realized that if he tends to call the army "the right arm of the government in maintaining the Union," then he must admit that "the government had two right arms, for the work on the waters can be postponed to no second place."¹. If we continue this survey to determine just what are the views of the different writers in reference to the effectiveness of the blockade, we may quote Doctor Scherer. A. C. Gordon tells us that:².

Doctor Scherer quotes the German political economist "Nauticus," in the Year-Book for 1900, on the effect of the Federal blockade upon the conflict between the North and the South. "The blockade of the South," says this able authority, indorsing Admiral Porter, "i.e., the sea-power of the North, contributed more to the downfall of the South than all other military operations put together. That is to say, the South, with its revenues, was wholly dependent on freedom of export for its land products, such as cotton, sugar, tobacco, etc. and for war supplies, besides machinery, wheat, peas, and potatoes, it had to obtain from the outside. Through the gradually expanded blockade, on all the coasts of the South (roundly, 3,000 sea-miles in length,) which was vigorously carried out by means of 313 steamers and 105 sailing vessels, the sea-traffic of the South was good as wholly cut off; at all events, the blockade sufficed more and more to break altogether the power of resistance of the brave Southern army. Want and misery everywhere was the frightful work of the blockade which prepared and accomplished the defeat of the South."

The Student of this phase of history, then, need go no further

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1. Hosmer--"The American Civil War"--Vol. 2--Pg. 185.
 2. A. C. Gordon--"Jefferson Davis"--Pg. 168.
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in his search for the results of the federal blockade and their relation to the downfall of the Confederacy. At this point, however, we come to a rather interesting question, namely, Which was more instrumental in causing the defeat of the Confederacy, the army or the naval blockade? Although this question is similar to the one, which came first the hen or the egg; it is nevertheless of interest to see what the various writers say. Albert Bushnell Hart is of the opinion that the naval blockade was more important than the army, for he says that:¹.

The true military reason for the collapse of the Confederacy is to be found, not so much in the fearful hammer-like blows of Thomas, Sherman, and Grant, as in the efforts of an unseen enemy, the ships of the blockading squadrons.

J. C. Schwab also expresses the same view when he says:².

----; but we lean to ascribing to the navy the larger share in undermining the power of resistance on the part of the South. It was the blockade rather than the ravages of the army that sapped the industrial strength of the Confederacy.

Another writer who also seems to point to the same conclusion is Stephen D. Lee who was a Lieutenant-General in the army of the Confederate States of America. It is interesting to note that he gives the naval blockade more credit in this connection than the Army even though he was an army man himself. In a letter to the Century Magazine of February 1897 he states that:³.

In addition to the land forces, the navy of the United States consisted of seven hundred vessels of war, manned by 105,000 sailors, with a fleet of transports, steamers,

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1. Albert Bushnell Hart--"Why the South was Defeated"--New Eng. Magazine--Vol. 11--Nov. 1891--Pg. 369.
 2. J. C. Schwab--"Confederate States"--Pg. 236
 3. Stephen D. Lee--"Why the Confederacy Failed"--Century Magazine V. 53--Feb. 1897--Pg. 627.
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barges, and coal floats almost innumerable, which in 1862, on the Mississippi River and its tributaries, alone numbered over twenty-two hundred vessels--a great help to General Grant and other generals in operating against Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

It was not known what was the number of vessels chartered on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts in moving the large armies to Port Royal, the North Carolina coast, Florida, Mobile, and Louisiana. The navy in its help was as decisive in results as the great armies in the field. Without its aid the armies of the Union might not have been successful. It blockaded the coast from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. It cut up the Confederacy by her rivers, in occupying these with gunboats; in establishing many depots and points of departure from the line of coasts and from the river-banks, for armies to invade, overrun, and destroy supplies in new territory; in transporting armies around territory they could not cross; and in saving armies when defeated.

However, let us now turn to the other side of the picture. The writers in the foregoing section tended to emphasize the importance of the blockade as ever against the movements of the Northern Army. In the writings of James Ford Rhodes, we find a slightly different attitude--an attitude which I believe is the more correct. He says:¹

But the blockade of itself might have been maintained even unto the crack of doom if Lee's and Johnston's armies remained intact, living in a fertile country cultivated by a mass of negro non-combatants, clothed from an excess supply of cotton and a limited supply of wool. The relation between our army and navy during the Civil War was the same as between the British army and navy in 1914 when the English fleet had effectually blockaded the German ports and kept the German fleet in a safe harbor. Said the London Times, "The Navy (is) our shield, the Army our sword."

Although this argument can be continued without end and has only been present to the reader as a matter of interest, the fact nevertheless remains that the blockade was an extremely important factor among the causes for the downfall of the Confederacy. It greatly aided the federal army in its maneuvers; it prevented the Confederate Government from replenishing from foreign countries and different sections of the South its supply of commodities such as food and machinery necessary

1. James Ford Rhodes--"History of the Civil War"--Pg. 365.

to continue the War; and it prevented the South from sending its cotton to the European markets and thus be in a position to obtain enough money to carry the war through to a successful conclusion--in other words, to use a more forceful expression, the blockade tightly and effectively corked up the only opening the Confederacy had until it rotted away and disintegrated, while the Army kept hammering and hammering away at it until the South could do nothing but collapse at the feet of its stronger adversary.

The question of the influence of "blockade-running" may now confront the reader's mind. Suffice it to say that although there was a great deal of blockade-running, its influence was nevertheless not greatly felt because it was not conducted on a scale huge enough to meet the demands of the entire South or even a noticeable fraction of the South. As one writer very aptly put it:¹.

The blockade-runners made at intervals perilous trips from Wilmington and Charleston to Nassau and back, carrying out cargoes of cotton and bringing in supplies. But these scanty imports were only a drop in the great empty bucket of want;

So we see that the blockade was effective notwithstanding the blockade-running. The continuance of the blockade throughout the war without much trouble on the part of the North lay, first, in the fact that the foreign countries, England and France in the main, remained neutral and would not interfere in behalf of the Confederacy for reasons mentioned in Chapter One; and secondly, in the fact that the South had no navy to speak of. In verifying the latter statement, we may present several quotations from different authors. John Fiske states that:².

In the defence of their rivers and harbours the Confederates showed their unfailing gallantry; but their ships were few, their engines of inferior make and liable to accident, and their commanders on

1. A.C. Gordon--"Hard Times in the Confederacy"--Cent. Mag.--Vol. 36--Sept. 1888
 2. John Fiske--"The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War" Pg. 762 P. 111

the whole unequal in training to the officers of the Federal navy; James Kendall Hosmer tells us that:^{1.}

Throughout all its immense extent of coast and numerous rivers, the Confederacy was compelled in naval warfare, with the single exception of the one day's victory of the Merrimac, in March, 1862, to accept defeat.;

while E. M. Law, a former Confederate Major-General, describes the situation as follows:^{2.}

The causes that contributed to Confederate failure were many, but among them all none can be compared in potency and far-reaching influence to the failure to provide an adequate navy as well as an army; and that a far-sighted statesmanship in the beginning of the struggle could have done this there is little doubt. With open ports, foreign trade would have given the Confederate finances impregnable strength, the armies would not have suffered the deprivation of many things necessary to the efficiency of soldiers in the field, and the rivers of the South would not have been free waterways for federal gun boats.

So we may conclude with the statement that the blockade caused in the main by the lack of foreign interference and by the lack of a Confederate navy was one of the dominant causes for the collapse of the Confederacy. Another of the so-called "military causes" which resulted in the defeat of the South was the lack of supplies.

The question of the lack of supplies brings up at this point a very interesting problem. Although it is very true to say that there was an enormous scarcity of all types of supplies; it is nevertheless also true to say that there was a plentiful supply of these commodities. The reader may object to this statement on the ground that it is not logical but, paradoxical as it may seem, it is nevertheless very true. The reason for this statement lies in the fact that although there was a plentiful supply of food in the Confederacy, it could not be transported

1. Hosmer--"The American Civil War"--Pg. 163.

2. E. M. Law--"Why the Confederacy Failed"--Century Magazine--V. 53--Feb. 1897
Pg. 630-31.

to the sections where it was most needed because of the lack of transportation facilities, and because of the system of food impressment which the government was forced to adopt. Almost every writer in this field supports the foregoing statement. Duncan Rose, the son of a Confederate officer emphasizes this point rather emphatically when he says:¹.

----; and there was plenty of food in the South, though the soldiers failed to get their share of it, for corn had taken the place of cotton in the fields, and there was an abundance of cattle and hogs!----. No, there was no lack of men and warlike resources in the South; the causes of failure must be looked for elsewhere.

Another writer who gives us the same view of this situation is James Ford Rhodes. He tells us that:².

Contemporary writings are full of complaints of lack of bread and meat. "Hunger," wrote Professor Gildersleeve, "was the dominant note of life in the Confederacy." While this was true of Virginia, which largely had Lee's army to feed and suffered from the devastation of the Northern armies, the rest of the Confederacy was, on the whole, pretty well supplied with food, although there was suffering from the short crop of cereals of 1862 in many states owing to a severe drought. But if the railroads had been in shape to do their proper work of distribution, all parts of the Confederacy would have been well supplied. -----While Virginia complained of scarcity, Sherman, in January, 1863, reported abundant supplies in Mississippi. "We found cattle and fat ones feeding quietly," he wrote. "The country everywhere abounds with corn."

We also learn from James Kendal Mosmer that although there was an abundance of food, many sections of the country were starving because of the lack of transportation facilities.

He says:³.

The soldiers of Sherman remember that in marching through Georgia they found food in abundance, and were angry because the prisoners at Andersonville were so near starving.

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1. Duncan Rose--"Why the Confederacy Failed"--Cent.Mag. Vol. 53
Nov. 1896--Pg. 33
 2. James Ford Rhodes--"History of the Civil War"--Pg. 369,370
 3. James K. Mosmer--"The American Civil War"--Vol.2--Pg. 275.
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The truth at the moment was that the abundance of Georgia could not be got northward to the Confederate armies; it was equally difficult to send it southward to the prisoners, who naturally to the Confederates were of secondary importance. The apparatus for equalization and distribution failed: for transit of every kind, the highways and the appliances, if not broken to pieces by violence, were ruined through wear and neglect.

Thus we see that the lack of railroad facilities was largely responsible for the shortage of supplies in the Confederacy. However, as I mentioned before, there was also another reason namely, the food impressment policy inaugurated by the Government in the midst of the war. The people would not sell their produce to the government at the price fixed by the latter, when they could obtain much more for their commodities at the market place. This feeling tended to make the people hide their produce and the Confederate agents found to their dismay what seemed to be a shortage of food. An excellent description of the foregoing situation may be found in the "Confederate States of America" by J. C. Schwab.¹

Another way in which the burdens of the war became intolerable was in the prevalent system of government impressments. The army did not rely for its supplies upon a voluntary sale of produce by farmers or dealers. At first, however, no compulsion was thought necessary to induce them to sell, but later the Congress was persuaded that the government could avoid paying the exorbitant prices demanded, and passed a law on March 26, 1863, providing for boards of assessment to determine the value of impressed goods, if the owner and military authorities could not agree upon a price.-----.

The immediate effect of the above system of impressing goods, that is, of forcing the producers to dispose of them to the government at prescribed prices, is summed up by General J. E. Johnston when he says that "no one would sell to the government,.....when he could get from his neighbors twice the government price for his horses or grain."

We also find the same author giving his views on the same situation in the "Cambridge Modern History". He states

1. Schwab---Pg. 202,3

that:1.

The paper-money policy and its natural concomitant, the arbitrary interference with prices, exaggerated the existing scarcity of provisions. The crops of Indian corn and wheat were abundant during the years of the war. Meats and cereals, though commanding increasing prices in currency, did not rise much above the 1860 level as expressed in gold. This was especially true in the agricultural districts remote from the cities and the seat of war--for instance, in North Carolina. The scarcity of food in the cities and in the army was certainly not as much due to deficient harvests or the inroads of the Federal armies as to the difficulty of attracting produce to the markets under the currency and impressment regime. Moreover, the latter policy led to a great accumulation of food material at points where, not being needed, it went to waste, while at other points the armies were suffering from want.

We need go no further then to realize that although there was a plentiful supply of necessary commodities within the Confederacy, there was nevertheless an enormous shortage of these commodities in many sections of the country owing to the lack of transit facilities and to the hated but inevitable impressment policy of the Government. There is also another reason given by some writers who account for this shortage of supplies, namely, administrative inefficiency. George Cary Eggleston gives us an interesting example of this so-called administrative inefficiency. He tells us that:2.

It was nothing to him (Commissary-general) that in the midst of plenty the army was upon a short allowance of food.----- Red tape was supreme, and no sword was permitted to cut it.

He continues to tell the reader that he once served on the coast of South Carolina,

a country which produces rice in great abundance, and in which fresh pork and mutton might be had almost for the asking, while the climate is wholly unsuited to the making of flour or bacon.².

; and that the officers were ordered to feed the army with

1. J. C. Schwab--Cambridge Mod. Hist.--V. 7--Pg. 618

2. George C. Eggleston--"A Rebel's Recollections"--Pg. 203.

bacon and flour. Owing to this inconsistency, Eggleston sent an endorsed letter to the Commissary-general testifying to the effect that it would be much cheaper to feed the army with rice and pork than with bacon and flour,

---but it resulted in nothing. The department presently found it impossible to give us full rations of bacon and flour, but it still refused to think of the remedy suggested. It cut down the ration instead, thus reducing the men to a state of semi-starvation in a country full of food.¹

This policy resulted in the situation where the soldiers had to eat the government food which cost threetimes as much as the type of food in the neighborhood, and then buy the neighborhood food out of their own salaries to complete their meal. Whether or not this situation is an extreme exception, I really do not know, but we must not lose sight of the fact that Roland G. Usher also emphasizes this administrative inefficiency of the Confederate Government. He states that:²

After all allowances have been made, there seems to have been in the Commissary department much corruption and inefficiency, whose immediate effect on the result of the War was only too apparent and for which Davis in person must largely be held responsible.

The results of this shortage of supplies, mainly food, caused by the lack of transit facilities, the impressment policy of the government, and possible, inefficiency in its administrative system, are only too obvious. It broke the spirit of the people, for as Mosmer tells us:³

That the Confederacy, shut off from the world by the ever-tightening blockade, was by this time badly out at the

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1. George C. Eggleston--"A Rebel's Recollections"--Pg. 203
 2. Roland G. Usher--"Rise of the Am. People"--Pg. 329
 3. James K. Mosmer--"American Civil War"--Vol. 2--Pg. 61
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elbows there is much evidence. In the Spring of 1863 there were bread riots; in November flour sold at over a hundred dollars a barrel, and suffering more acute was impending. The painful lack in the Confederacy of all supplies except food and the raw materials for fabrics was a source of weakness which could not be overcome.

It also broke the spirit of the army and was the cause for the numerous desertions during the last year of the war. Robert Tansill, a Confederate officer, gives us an excellent description of the deplorable state of the army. He states that:¹

During all this extended period the soldiers subsisted principally upon a third of a pound of meat, frequently of an inferior quality, and a pound of coarse corn meal or flour. Vegetables could rarely be procured, and some days they were entirely without provisions of any kind. General Lee's army, for as many as five days at a time, were without any meat. Sometimes a quarter of a pound of lard was served out in lieu of the meat. Had it not been for the scanty additions of provisions and clothing which the love of relatives and friends occasionally sent them, they would have been compelled to disband or perish in their camps. With such reduced rations many were often exposed with thin and tattered clothes to the freezing winter storms, without tents, overcoats, blankets, or shoes.

Robert C. Wood also gives us a fine analysis of the foregoing situation. He writes:²

The price of all the commodities of life rose as rapidly as the purchasing power of Confederate money fell. The withdrawal of thousands from agricultural pursuits, the forced abandonment of large and productive areas of country, the closing of foreign markets of supply and other causes created a shortage in food supplies. It was with great difficulty that adequate provision could be made for the support of the troops in the field. It may be said that from 1863, until the close of the war, the Confederate soldiers could not be furnished with sufficient food. At times, the combined commissary issues for a week were not equivalent to one day's full rations. The attenuated condition of the men at the time of their surrender was a touching evidence of the privations they had endured.

Even Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederacy and

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1. Robert Tansill--"Cause for failure of Confederate States"--P.13
 2. Robert C. Wood--"Confederate Handbook"--Pg. 76
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Commander-in-chief of the army decries the horrible situation of the soldier. In his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," he gives us, perhaps with a tear in his eye, the following description:¹

A leader, less resolute, an army less heroically resisting fatigue, constant watching, and starvation, would long since have reached the conclusion that surrender was a necessity! Lee had left Petersburg with not more than twenty thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and four thousand artillery. Men and horses all reduced below the standard of efficiency by exposure and insufficient supplies of clothing, food, and forage, only the mutual confidence between the men and their commander could have sustained either under the trials to which they were subjected. It is not a matter of surprise that the army had wasted away to a mere remnant, but rather that it had continued to exist as an organized body still willing to do battle. All the evidence we have proves that the proud, cheerful spirit both of the army and its leader had resisted the extremes of privation and danger, and never sunk until confronted by surrender.

Enough material has been presented to indicate that the blockade, the lack of railroad facilities, the impressment policy of the government and the inefficiency in the Administrative department caused a shortage of necessary supplies which in turn resulted in the loss of spirit among the people and soldiers, and in turn led to desertion and finally in the downfall of the Confederacy. So much for the second of the "Military Causes," namely, the lack of supplies; now, let us turn to the third cause, Desertion.

It is an established fact among writers of history that there was an enormous amount of desertion from the Confederate army in the latter half of the war--especially in the last year. These desertions greatly depleted the strength of the army. Robert Tansill states that:²

Towards the close of the year 1864 frequently twenty or thirty would leave in a body from the different armies, under cover of the night, some going to the enemy, and others to their homes;-----

The desertions from the army were so great that on the 1st of April 1865, General Lee's immediate command only amounted to about 30,000 effective soldiers, and that of General Johnston to 13,000. The united armies of Generals Grant and Sherman

1. Jeff. Davis--"Rise and Fall of the Confederate Gov'ty"--V.2--P.658.

2. Rob't. Tansill, "Causes for the failure of the Confederate States"--P. 14, 15

were probably not less than 200,000."

Although each individual desertion may have been caused by some circumstance or other, there nevertheless are several outstanding causes which impelled most deserters to break their oath of allegiance and commit this so-called "unpardonable sin." The most important cause was the suffering occasioned by the lack of supplies. The Confederate soldier suffered tremendously throughout the war and it seems to me that those who severely criticize the deserter do not realize the extent of his suffering. There are many accounts which depict the soldiers' condition--the most vivid give by Sara M. Handy, the daughter of a Virginian. She tells us that:¹

We did not realize fully, however, that, so far as we Virginians were concerned, the end had come, until the next day, when General Fitz Lee and his staff stopped to rest and water their horses, on their way they scarcely knew whither. We set before them the best we had for lunch; but while the members of his staff ate like hungry men, the general scarcely tasted food, and sat with his head in his hands, as one who has suffered a crushing blow. Only once did he really rouse himself, when my sister spoke bitterly of the straggling from the ranks of our army; then his eyes flashed, and his voice took on its old tone. "Madam," he said, "the men were not to blame. They fought like devils, until they were faint with hunger, and their officers sent them in quest of food. Our rations from Amelia Court House to Appomattox were an ear of corn a day apiece for the men; nothing for the horses.

General John B. Gordon of the Confederate Army also gives us a graphic description of the suffering. While reading his "Reminiscences," we learn that:²

The condition of our army was daily becoming more desperate. Starvation, literal starvation, was doing its deadly work. So depleted and poisoned was the blood of many of Lee's men from insufficient and unsound food that a slight wound which would probably not have been reported at the beginning of the war would often cause blood-poison, gangrene, and death. Yet the spirits of these brave men seemed to rise as their condition grew more desperate. The grim humor of the camp was waging incessant warfare against despondency. They would not permit

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1. Sara Matthews Handy--"In the Last Days of the Confederacy"--Atlantic Monthly--V. 37--Jan. 1901--Pg. 104.
 2. John B. Gordon--"Reminiscences of the Civil War"--Pg. 381
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one another to be disheartened at any trial, or to complain at the burden on the chafing of any yoke which duty imposed. It was a harrowing but not uncommon sight to see those hungry men gather the wasted corn from under the feet of half-fed horses, and wash and parch and eat it so as to satisfy in some measure their craving for food. It was marvelous that their spirits were not crushed, and still more marvelous that they would extract fun from every phase of destitution.

A more concrete example of the suffering occasioned by the lack of supplies is a requisition for shoes sent by General Johnson in February, 1864. He states that:¹.

The Fifth Regiment is unable to drill for want of shoes. The Eighth Regiment will soon be unfit for duty from the same cause; and indeed, when shoes are supplied, the men will be unable to wear them for a long while, such is the horrible condition of their feet from long exposure.

Ella Lonn supplements this description by saying that:¹.

Limping on the hard turn-pikes with blistered feet, they literally traced their path with blood. Sometimes they ploughed through mud above their ankles or again they slipped on roads hard and sharp with ice so that they were falling and their guns going off all down the column. It was not unusual to require them to march under such conditions fifty miles a day.

However, the suffering of the soldier was only one of the many reasons for deserting. Another very important cause was the anxiety of the soldier for his family. A good many soldiers upon realizing that their families were suffering as much as they were--both from hunger and marauding bands of deserters--decided that their duty was to protect their families rather than remain and fight for a lost cause. John C. Schwab stresses this point when he says that:².

Notwithstanding the efforts of the government to quell disaffection in the ranks and prevent desertions, the latter continued in increasing proportions during the last year of the war, when many were compelled to desert not only from

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1. Ella Lonn--"Desertion During the Civil War"--Pg. 8
 2. John C. Schwab--"Confederate States"--Pg. 200
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want of food and clothing, but also from the necessity of providing for their families.

Robert Tansill also seems to hold the same view--namely, that anxiety for their families caused many soldiers to desert--when he says:¹.

The condition of the reserve force was, like that of the regular army, a hard one. Often suddenly called from their homes to camp without warning, with but a single suit of clothes, sometimes without tents, overcoats, or blankets, with less than half rations;----- Their miserable conditions was calculated to daunt the stoutest hart, more especially those who are only able to judge of the condition and merits of a cause by its effects upon themselves. Their letters to their kindred and friends were filled with melancholy descriptions of their terrible suffering, which assisted to excite a feeling throughout the country against the war. Desertions were numerous, and almost daily. Such were the evil influences against which the Confederacy had to contend, and had such a great share in its downfall.

Another incident which tends to point to the tremendous influence exerted by this factor on the number of deserters is described by Ella Lonn. The account is indeed pathetic and heartrending. She tells us that:².

A certain Edward Cooper was being tried by court-martial for desertion. When he was told to produce witnesses, he said his only defense was a letter from his wife, which he handed to the president of the court. It read as follows:

"My dear Edward:-I have always been proud of you, and since your connection with the Confederate army, I have been prouder than every before. I would not have you do anything wrong for the world, but before God, Edward, unless you come home, we must die. Last night, I was aroused by little Eddie's crying. I called and said 'What is the matter, Eddie?' and he said, 'O mamma! I am so hungry!' And Lucy, Edward, your darling Lucy; she never complains, but she is growing thinner and thinner every day. And before God, Edward, unless you come home, we must die.

Your Mappy

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1. Robert Tansill--"Causes for the Failure of the Confederacy"--Pg.17
 2. Ella Lonn--"Desertion during the Civil War"--Pg. 13
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This letter melted the court to tears for they realized that this situation was very very similar to their own, but as it was their duty, they sentenced the prisoner to death for desertion. However, Lee pardoned the prisoner after reviewing the case. It is not difficult, then, to understand why many deserted. The real problem that should confront the student of this phase of history is not why so many deserted; but instead, why so many did not desert under those trying circumstances. Even General Lee Rhodes tells us, stressed the influence of the despondency of the people at home upon desertion. He states that:¹.

The ever increasing number of deserters from a general so beloved as Lee was a harbinger of the coming downfall. ----- February 24 (1864) he (Lee) called "attention to the alarming number of desertions." They "are chiefly from the North Carolina regiments," he went on to say, "and especially those from the western part of that State. It seems that the men are influenced very much by the representations of their friends at home who appear to have become very despondent---"

Thus we see that the suffering occasioned by the lack of supplies and the anxiety that the soldiers felt for their families were two very important causes of desertion. Another reason given by writers is the fact that the soldiers did not always receive their pay. The same author mentioned above again quotes Lee:².

Lee called attention to the "alarming frequency of desertions" from his army which were due mainly to the "insufficiency of food and non-payment of the troops."

Ella Lonn also emphasized this fact when she says that:³.

The soldiers' pay--the paltry sum of eleven dollars a month in Treasury notes--was almost always delayed, and the depreciation already manifested in the fall of 1862,

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1. James Ford Rhodes--"History of the U.S."--V.5--P.74, 75.
 2. James Ford Rhodes--"History of the U.S."--V.5--P.60
 3. Ella Lonn--"Desertion"--Pg. 10
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due to military failures, made it of little value when it did come.

Still another reason given for the desertion is the fact that many soldiers fought on the southern side without their "heart" in the struggle--in other words, they fought without a motive. Private W. L. Goss gives us some interesting accounts in reference to these soldiers. In his recollections he tells us that:¹.

One of them (Southern Prisoners) was a good-looking, intelligent fellow about twenty-two years of age. He informed one of my comrades that he belonged to a North Carolina regiment. He was a college graduate, and the prospect of spending a summer at the North did not seem to displease him. He confidentially said that he had been a Union man just as long as he could, and finally went into the Confederate army to save his property and reputation and to avoid conscription. He added: "There are thousands in the South just like me. We didn't want the war, and resisted the sentiment of secession as long as we could. Now it has gone so far we've got to fight or sever all the associations with which our lives are interlinked."

In another section of his "Recollections," Private Goss emphasizes the same fact. He states that:².

From the number of interviews held at the different times with our Confederate prisoners, I gathered the general impression that their private soldiers knew but very little about the causes of the war, but were fighting "not to get licked," which is so strong a feeling human nature that I may say it will account for much hard fighting on both sides.

Private Goss is not the only person to notice this fact. Ella Loon is discussing the causes of desertion says that:³.

Some, untutored and narrow-minded, dragged from the rocky mountains of the Carolinas, Georgia, and Alabama, from the pine hills and lowlands of Louisiana, and from the swamps of Florida and Mississippi, were ignorant of the real issues at stake and were but little identified with the struggle.

Other reasons given for desertions are the fact that the soldiers grew weary of the war⁴; the lack of strict discipline in the

1. W. L. Goss--"Recollections of a Private"--"Cent. Articles"
V. 1--Aug. 1885--Pg. 637-8.

2. Goss--"Recollections"--Cent. Art.--V.1--Mar.1885--Pg.776.

3. Ella Loon--"Desertion"--Pg.3

4. Ella Loon--"Desertion"--Pg.18

Confederate ranks¹., and the fact that the average soldier believed that "nine-tenths of the youngsters of the land whose relatives are conspicuous in society, wealthy or influential, obtain some safe perch where they can doze with their heads under their wings."² The results of this tremendous amount of desertion were of far-reaching importance. In the first place, the lack of soldiers hindered the Confederate generals in opposing the federal troops. Ella Lonn tells us that:³

----, the defections weakened and sapped the strength of the Confederacy by the steady diminution of forces to oppose the foe faster than additions could be made by conscription.

The same author tells us that desertion was the cause for the fact that much food spoiled. She continues to say that:⁴

According to Gov. Vance, hundreds of thousands of bushels of grain was spoiling at the various depots of the South in 1863 because of the lack of transportation; and the inability to transport supplies was partly due at least, to the lack of soldiers to protect the transport trains.

Desertion also tended to break the spirit of the soldiers remaining in the ranks as well as the spirit of the people. The deserters terrorized the people and made them lose faith in the ability of the government to continue the war. Ella Lonn stresses the truth of this statement when she says that:⁵

On the other hand, the desertion indubitably and inevitably contributed to break down the morale in the South. The citizenry was thoroughly terrorized and dispirited by the organized bands of outlaws who threatened their lives and property if they dared to aid the constituted authorities

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1. J. B. Jones--"Rebel Clerk's Diary"--V.2--Pg. 343
 2. Ella Lonn--"Desertion"--Pg. 14.
 3. Ella Lonn--"Desertion"--Pg. 120.
 4. Ella Lonn--"Desertion"--Pg. 121.
 5. Ella Lonn--"Desertion"--Pg. 121, 122.
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in arresting the mauraunders. They lost all faith in a government unable even to preserve the law and order to protect its citizens, in a government which was constantly deceiving them with vain hopes of victory.

From the foregoing array of facts, we may safely conclude with the statement that desertion--caused by the suffering from the lack of supplies, the anxiety that the soldiers held for their families, the failure to obtain their pay, the lack of a definite motive in fighting, the growing weariness of the war, the lack of strict discipline in the army, and the prevailing belief that "it was a rich man's war and a poor man's fight," which resulted in a lack of soldiers for fighting and protective purposes and which tended to break the spirit of both the army and the people--was a prime factor in precipitating the catastrophe of 1865. Thus concludes our dissertation on the third "military cause," leading to the downfall of the Confederacy. Before proceeding to the next topic, I wish to present to the reader a table of the number of deserters from the Confederate army by states. It is interesting to note that the greatest number of desertions occurred in the states that had the most dissension.¹.

Table 1

Number of Deserters From the Confederate Army by States

	Officers	Men
Maryland	1	28
Virginia	84	12071
North Carolina	428	23694
South Carolina	36	3579
Georgia	79	6797
Florida	3	2211
Alabama	5	1578
Mississippi	56	11604
Louisiana	24	4517
Texas	9	4655
Arkansas	66	10029
Missouri	45	4365

¹. Ella Loon--"Desertion"--Appendix--p. 231

(Con't)

Tennessee	153	12155
Kentucky	16	3466
Arizona		16
Indian Territory		154
Regular Army	5	1274
Jeff. Davis Legion	14	1207
	<u>1028</u>	<u>103400</u>

The fourth and last of the "military causes" for the collapse of the Confederacy was the so-called inefficient organization of the army. Although very few writers mention this factor, I nevertheless believe that it should be commented upon, because the purpose of this book is to discuss not only those factors upon which authorities agree, but also every possible cause which may have aided in precipitating the collapse of the Confederacy. Some writers are of the opinion that several details concerning the organization of the army were not conducive towards proper discipline--another cause of desertion. Robert Tansill tells us that the military elections were detrimental to discipline.¹

Congress, with the view of rendering the conscription law as acceptable as possible to the army, inserted a clause in that act authorizing the companies to elect their officers, and the company officers to elect the field officers, a policy subversive of good order, military discipline, and efficiency.

By these elections many officers of real merit, who had served with honor and distinction, were lost to the army, and their places filled, with few exceptions, by incompetent ones, which seriously impaired the strength and efficiency of the army, from which it never entirely recovered, and is one of the many influences which led to its final overthrow.

Other factors, this author says, which had a pernicious effect on the discipline of the army, were the conscription law of 1862 and the exemption clause of 1864. He tells us that:²

---it (Conscription law) contained a provision permitting the soldiers to furnish substitutes, which was both impolitic

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1. Robert Tansill--"Causes for Failure of Confederacy"--Pg. 10
 2. Robert Tansill--"Causes for Failure of Confederacy"--Pg. 9
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and unjust, and had, as ought to have been anticipated, a pernicious effect upon the army,-----.

Robert Tansill, who by the way was a captain in the United States marine corps, and later a colonel in the Confederate service, continues his argument by saying that:¹.

But in repealing the law authorizing substitutes, Congress unfortunately provided for another class of exemptions still more obnoxious. They exempted from military service all farmers who worked or employed fifteen slave hands, as well as all farmers who would give bond to furnish a certain amount of provisions at prescribed prices. These exemptions were denounced by the disaffected as partial and unjust, which prompted the declaration before quoted, that it was a "rich man's war and a poor man's fight."

Another fact that made for dissension within the army was the employment of negroes as soldiers. Tansill tells us that:².

The last law of Congress for augmenting the army was passed in March, 1865, which provided for the employment of negroes as soldiers. This law created prejudicial dissensions, which contributed to the overthrow of the Confederacy.

Although I believe that Tansill has placed too much importance upon the foregoing factors, we should not lose sight of the fact that George Cary Eggleston also tends to stress the poor discipline of the Confederacy army. He says that:³.

The men who volunteered went to war of their own accord, and were wholly unaccustomed to acting on any other than their own motion. They were hardy lovers of field sports, accustomed to out-door life, and in all physical respects excellent material of which to make an army. But they were not used to control of any sort, and were not disposed to obey anybody except for good and sufficient reason given.-----
----- Officers were no better than men, and so officers and men massed and slept together on terms of entire equality, quarreling and even fighting now and then, in a gentlemanly

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1. Robert Tansill--"Causes for failure of Confederacy"--Pg. 16
 2. Robert Tansill--"Causes for failure of Confederacy"--Pg. 16
 3. George C. Eggleston "A Rebel's Recollections"--Pg. 31,32.
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way, but without a thought of allowing a difference of military rank to have any influence in the matter. The theory was that the officers were the creatures of the men, chosen by election to represent their constituency in the performance of certain duties, and that only during good behavior.

The results of this lack of discipline may be stated in the words of General Lee--"Desertion is increasing in the army, notwithstanding all my efforts to stop it. I think a rigid execution of the law is mercy in the end. The great want in our army is firm discipline."¹.

Another way in which the army was organized inefficiently, Duncan Rose tells us, was the so-called "policy of dispersion."².

From first to last the armies of the Confederacy were never concentrated. Of the six hundred thousand men in arms, there were never got together on a single battlefield more than seventy thousand available men. The scattered armies wasted away, were destroyed and captured piece meal, trying to defend the frontiers;----. Such were the results of the policy of dispersion.

It seems to me that Duncan Rose, the son of a Confederate officer, did not realize when he wrote this article that the Confederate officers could not amass a majority of their men in one place because the rest of the country would then be left unprotected. Another fact to remember is the lack of transportation facilities which prevented the rapid transporting of troops from one locality to another. In the same article, Rose continues to comment on the neglect of the cavalry.³.

And so, from the beginning to the end, either because the government could not learn the value of mounted troops, or was incapable of changing a policy once adopted, or for some inexplicable reason, the cavalry was underrated and neglected.

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1. J. B. Jones--"A Rebel Clerk's Diary"--V.2--Pg.343 (Dec.1, 1864)
 2. Duncan Rose--"Why the Confed. Failed"--Cent.Mag.-V.53-Nov.1896-Pg.36.
 3. Duncan Rose--Pg. 37
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A glance at the census of 1860 will show one that there were horses enough in Texas, or Georgia and North Carolina, to have mounted all the Confederate armies in the field, leaving enough to make crops;-----.

Although this criticism concerning the neglect of the cavalry appears well stated, the reader should nevertheless remember that for every addition to the cavalry force there must also be one subtraction from the infantry; and again, that the conscription of the horses would create much dissension among the farmers. So, it seems to me that the student should take Rose's criticism with a "grain of salt." I should also like to caution the reader in another respect, namely, that he should not lay too much stress on this so-called "inefficient organization of the Confederate army," for writers tell us that in the long run the southern troops fought just as well as the norther troops. Charles A. Patch of the U. S. Volunteers tells us that:1.

There appears to have been gathered, by many of the readers of the war literature of the day, a distinctly erroneous impression to the effect that the South fought better than the North; or to put in in another way, that the Southerner was the better soldier.


He continues to tell us in the same article that:2.

The ten thousand Union soldiers who fell in death or wounds before the heights of Fredericksburg, and the seventeen thousand lost at Chancellorsville, were the equals in bravery of any soldiers in the annals of warfare; so were the twenty-odd thousand who bathed Gettysburg's ridge with blood, or the fourscore thousands carried from the fields of Virginia when Grant was in command.

However, we should not entirely discard the fact that the "inefficiency" may have had something to do with the downfall of the Confederacy--even though only very slightly. We have at last reached

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1. Chas. A. Patch--"Valor and Skill in the Civil War"--"Cent. Articles" V. 5--May 1890--P. 144.
 2. Chas. A. Patch--Pg. 150
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the end of our discussion of the "military causes" which led to the collapse of the Confederacy; we have taken up in detail the causes and results of the federal blockade, the causes and results of the lack of supplies, the causes and results of desertion, and lastly, the causes and results of the so-called "inefficient organization of the army;" and, I believe, we may be safe in saying that the "military causes" described above did have an enormous effect in precipitating the downfall of the Confederacy. Let us now proceed to study, what I term, the financial and economic causes.



CAUSES FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONFEDERACY

Chapter 111

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSES

One of the most important of the financial and economic causes which led to the collapse of the Confederacy was the excessive inflation of worthless paper money. This policy led to grave consequences--the utter derangement and break-up of the economic system of the south. There isn't one author in this phase of the Civil War who does not lay great stress on this policy as a cause for the catastrophe of 1865. Duncan Rose says that: 1.

The confederate government was smothered and strangled to death with its own irredeemable paper money.--The "sinews of war" mean specie, and nothing but specie. And to get specie, and those things which specie will buy, there must be taxes, taxes, taxes.

Robert Tansill also substantiates this fact. He says: 2.

The enormous amount of paper money issued by the government from 1861 to 1863, without levying taxes commensurate with its expenditures, caused, as was natural, a rapid depreciation in the currency.

As Tansill states, there was indeed an enormous amount of this worthless paper currency issued both by the government and by the other agencies. As expressed by J. C. Schwab, we learn that: 3.

Judging from the most reliable sources, the Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury, we conclude that something over

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1. Duncan Rose, "Why the Confederacy Failed".
Cent. Mag.--V. 53--Nov. 1896-Pg. 34
 2. Rob't Tansill, "Causes for failure of Confed." pg. 8
 3. J. C. Schwab, "Confederate States"--Pg. 165
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\$1,000,000 in treasury notes were in active circulation during June and July, 1861; that the amount rose to above \$30,000,000 before the end of the year; and passed \$100,000,000 by March, 1862, \$200,000,000 by August of that year, and reached something like \$450,000,000 by December, 1862. By the fall of 1863, at least \$700,000,000 of treasury notes must have been in circulation, which sum must have been increased by several hundreds of millions of dollars before the end of the war, though the figures after the fall of 1864 are purely conjectural.

On the following page, the same author tells us that this amount was supplemented by other agencies.

Even if we knew the successive amounts of Confederate treasury notes in the hands of the public during the war, this signify little, as they formed but a part of the currency; the State, municipal, bank, corporate, and individual notes formed the other, and, as we have seen, no inconsiderable part.

John A. Campbell, formerly Assistant Secretary of War, C.S.A., gives us a more conservative estimate. In reference to the year 1864, he states that: 1.

It became finally to be seen that the finances were in hopeless ruin. Treasury notes to \$400,000,000 had been issued; these were selling at sixty to one for specie at the treasury. The supply of specie 15th February was \$750,000;-----.

Another author who comments upon the discrepancy between the amount of paper money issued and the reserve in the confederate treasury to back it up is Duncan Rose. He tells us that: 2.

The ports of the Confederacy were all blockaded, so there was really nothing that the government could do to raise money except issue bonds and paper bills. Of these, before the war ended, between one and two thousand millions of dollars--nominal value--had been emitted, the paper bills amounting to nearly one billion, or over one half of the whole. None does this include the millions of paper bills issued by state authority and by bank,-----.

During the same time, to the end of 1864, there was raised by taxation the pitiful sum of forty-eight millions of dollars, and that all paper money.

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1. J.A. Campbell, "Cent. Articles"--V.5--Oct. 1889--P.950
 2. Duncan Rose, "Cent. Mag."--Nov. 1896--V.53--P. 34
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We see then that the inflation of paper money greatly weakened the economic structure of the Confederacy. At this point we come to a very interesting question, namely, Were the financial troubles inevitable or were they caused by the lack of foresight of the treasury officials? Different authors take opposing sides--a fact which makes this question all the more interesting. J. C. Schwab is under the impression that the Secretary of Treasury, Memminger, is responsible for the failure in the financial field. He says that: 1.

Among the agencies which weakened the power of the South to resist the North we put first the Federal blockade and the Confederate financial policy. Memminger cannot escape the responsibility for the latter. It was framed largely upon lines suggested by him; and its development and final culmination in utter government bankruptcy was not seriously resisted by him. A man of his antecedents and limited experience could not have been expected to formulate a brilliant fiscal policy and win public favor for it.----- A financier of like talent to that of the Southern military leaders would doubtless have conducted the affairs of the treasury with more success.

Robert Tansill, a colonel in the Confederate service, seems to hold the same opinion. He says: 2.

When it is remembered that money is one of the principal sinews of war, it seems strange that the Government did not adopt timely measures to sustain its credit, whereas the failure to do so had a considerable share in its destruction.

Roland G. Usher who though holding to the same view, nevertheless does not criticize Secretary Memminger as harshly as do the others. He says: 3.

The finances of the Confederacy seem also to have been mismanaged. The Secretary of the Treasury, Memminger, was honest and well-intentioned, but totally unacquainted with finance. He had, indeed, a fundamental difficulty to struggle with which no skill could have surmounted--the lack of sufficient specie in the country to serve as an adequate medium of exchange for domestic and foreign business.

On the other hand, we find writers such as Edward Channing who

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1. J. C. Schwab "Confederate States"--p.69,70.
 2. Rob't Tansill, "Causes"-p.8
 3. R. G. Usher "Rise of Am. People" p.329
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take the opposite views, namely, that the collapse of the economic foundation was inevitable, and not the result of any lack of foresight on the part of the treasury official. Channing says that:1.

The Secretary of the Treasury, C. G. Memminger, was a successful business man of Charleston and he had good advisers; but the problem that he and the Confederate Congress had to face was practically insoluble.

I believe that this view is the more correct one, for only from a careful study of the facts can one realize fully how difficult were the conditions that the financial department of the Confederacy had to work under. In the first place the only large source of revenue that the Confederacy had, namely, the sale of cotton in European Markets, was wiped out by the federal blockade--thus forcing the treasury department to rely upon the Confederacy itself for revenue to carry out the war, a pitiful situation indeed. Albert Bushnell Hart stresses this fact in the following passage: 2.

One of the early acts of the Confederacy was to prohibit the exportation of cotton, except from Confederate seaports; it was hoped thereby to bring foreign powers to interfere. The result was that a considerable part of the cotton crop of 1860 and almost the whole of the crops of 1862-3-4 were shut in by the blockade.

In the second place, we learn that the South was too poor to make taxation worthwhile. Don Carlos Buell, a Major-General of the U. S. V., states that:3.

Intrinsically the greenbacks of the North were no better than the paper promises of the South; yet they constituted virtually the sole circulating medium, were

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1. Ed. Channing, "Hist. of the U.S."--V. 6--Pg. 411
 2. A.B. Hart, "Why the South was Defeated"
New Eng. Mag.--V. 11--Nov. 1891--Pg. 365
 3. Don Carlos Buell, "Why the Confed. Failed"
Cent. Mag. V. 53--Feb. 1897--Pg. 631
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received with confidence, and the country was commercially prosperous during the whole war. In the North the use of such money was a policy or device. In the South it was a necessity; for, unable to borrow money abroad, if direct taxation could have been resorted to it would have been futile: the country did not possess wealth enough in an available form for the emergency.

Turning from Don Carlos Buell's general statement that very little revenue was collected from taxation, we learn from Schwab that:1.

The total amount of specie thus secured could not have exceeded 27 millions of dollars. This sum constituted the entire specie revenue of the Confederate government during its four years' existence. The government was driven to rely for a revenue more and more upon issues of treasury notes.

Then again, we should remember that the value of paper money remains stable only so long as the people have confidence in the government; and, we must not blame the treasury officials for the fact that the people soon lost confidence in the government, for this loss of confidence was occasioned by many factors described in Chapter 1 and 2 which Secretary Memminger and his associates could not possibly control. Don Carlos Buell emphasizes this point when he says: 2.

The failure of the financial expedient thus adopted by the South from necessity, without any foundation of material value, became inevitable as soon as it lost the confidence of the public. If there was at the time no other symptom of a distrust of their cause, the rejection of the money of the Confederacy by the people was a sufficient sign of a lack of faith. The bad money was a consequence, not a cause.

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1. J. C. Schwab, "Confed. States", pg. 43, 44
 2. Don C. Buell, U. S. V., "Why the Confederacy failed".
Cent. Mag.--V. 53--Feb. 1897--Pg. 631
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Therefore, after studying the difficulties that the Treasury department had to cope with, we may say that it is unfair to place the blame for the collapse of the Confederacy's economic structure entirely upon Secretary Memminger. I, for one, would venture the assertion that the same result would have appeared no matter who was the Secretary of the Treasury, for the excessive issue of paper money was the only possible method that the department could have followed under those circumstances. We find O. O. Howard, a Major-General of the U. S. Army during the Civil War, expressing the same view. 1.

But all peoples subjected to extraordinary expenses are wont to throw part of the cost upon the future. The Union government did the same in the Civil War. It was hardly possible for the Confederacy to avoid the issue of these promises. Their reckless issue toward the end was like the straw at which the drowning man catches; it was an endeavor to keep the Confederate armies together for a little space while the government looked and prayed for European help.

Even though we cannot place all the blame upon Secretary Memminger, neither can we place all the blame on the people for the Confederate government specifically stated, as it had to, that it would pay the stipulated amount of each note to the bearer of the imprinted price of paper only at the expiration of a specified period of time²(after the ratification of a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the United States of America).

The student can readily see then, that as the government continued to issue this paper money, and as the possibility for redemption

1. O. O. Howard, "Why the Confed. Failed".

Cent. Mag.--V.53--Feb. 1897--Pg. 632

2. A. C. Gordon, "Hard times in the Confed."

"Cent. Articles"--V.IV--Sept. 1888--Pg. 763

at its face value gradually faded away, the people lost confidence in the money, thus producing a tremendous decline in the value of the dollar. Here, ¹ present a table from a Confederate Handbook ¹, indicating the tremendous decline in the value of a confederate dollar.

Taking gold as a standard, a Confederate paper dollar was worth as follows, at the different dates indicated:

	CENTS
December 1, 1861-----	.80
December 15, 1861-----	.75
February 1, 1862-----	.60
February 1, 1863-----	.20
June, 1863-----	.08
November, 1864-----	.04 $\frac{1}{2}$
January, 1865-----	.02 $\frac{1}{2}$
April 1, 1865-----	.01 $\frac{1}{2}$

As the war progressed, prices of all commodities rose enormously--in fact, so enormously, that we of the twentieth century and citizens of a stable government can hardly believe it. It seemed as if some mysterious power was playfully distorting and twisting the economic structure of the Confederacy entirely out of shape for its own amusement and entertainment. The following account² is taken from the same author quoted above.

In 1865, everything had largely advanced in price. The following is an abstract from the expense account of a Confederate officer who left Richmond for Augusta, Ga., about one month before General Lee Surrendered:

March 11, Meals on road-----	\$20
March 17, Cigars and bitters-----	600
March 20, 1 pair eyeglasses-----	135
March 20, Hair cutting and shave-----	10
March 20, Candles-----	50
March 23, Coat, Vest and pants-----	2700
March 27, 1 gallon whisky-----	400
March 30, 1 pair boots-----	700
April 12, 6 yards linen, 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ wide-----	1200
April 14, 1 ounce sulphate quinine-----	1700
April 14, 2 weeks' board-----	700
April 14, Bought \$60 gold-----	6000
April 20, 1 dozen Catawba Wine-----	900
April 20, Shad and sundries-----	75
A April 20, Matches-----	25
April 1, 1 Penknife-----	125
April 1, 1 package brown Windsor Soap-----	50

1. Robert C. Wood, "Confederate Handbook", pg. 76
2. pg. 77

Referring to the last item, namely, a payment of fifty dollars for a package of soap, I wonder if many of us on our present salaries could keep ourselves clean, let alone the thousand and one other expenses that we must incur. J. B. Jones also comments on this enormous rise in price. Writing in February 28, 1864, he says that: 1.

I copy this advertisement from a morning paper:
 "Notice--Owing to the heavy advance of feed, we are compelled to charge the following rates for boarding horses on and after the 1st of March:

Board per month-----	\$360.00
Board per day-----	15.00
Single feed-----	5.00

Virginia Stables"

Although I do not know the sentiments of the reader, I, for one, know that before paying the foregoing prices, I would allow my horse to share both my bed and meals with me. A rather humorous incident occasioned by this excessive rise in price is described 2. by George C. Eggleston. A cavalry officer entered a store and asked for a pair of boots priced at two hundred dollars. He offered the store-keeper a five hundred dollar note, but the latter could not make the change. "Never mind," said the cavalier, "I'll keep the boots anyhow. Keep the change. I never let a little matter of three hundred dollars stand in the way of a trade." "Eggleston who tells this story follows with the comment that this occurred" on the day before Lee's surrender, but it would not have been an impossible occurrence at any time during the preceding year". We also learn from A. C. Gordon³ that "in the case of flour, which in March, 1863, sold for \$25.00 per Barrel;

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1. J. B. Jones, "A Rebel Clerk's Diary"--V. 2--Pg. 160
 2. G. C. Eggleston, "A Rebel's Recollections"--Pg. 92
 3. A. C. Gordon, "Hard Times in the Confederacy"
 "Cent. Articles"--V. 10--Sept. 1888--Pg. 764
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in January, 1864, for \$95.00 per barrel; (it sold) in January, 1865, for \$1000.00 per barrel". He also describes another point of interest--a fact that would be very pleasing to the ears of those who are continually annoyed by the singing of the modern girl. He says: 1.

Yet the sheet music, printed, like the newspapers, in the roughest style, upon the commonest paper, with now and then a caricatured lithographic likeness of some Confederate general on the title-page, continued to be sold and sung, even though its price ran from one to two dollars per sheet.

I presume that this price kept many a girl from displaying her "nightingale prowess" or as some call it her singing ability--a fact which greatly lessened the horrors of the Civil War. But enough of the Humorous side of this tragedy! Let us turn to our original discussion. This excessive rise in price led to a great deal of speculation. People would buy the commodities at the prevailing price and refused to sell them to those who needed them unless they received an exorbitant price--thus forcing the price up, and making a profit. J. C. Schwab states that:2.

With the value of the currency constantly falling, and the price of commodities rising, the holder of notes felt the strongest incentive to turn them into commodities. The longer he held the notes, the less they would buy. The rising market invariably led to the wildest speculation, into which everyone was necessarily and unconsciously drawn.

Another author who makes the same comment is George C. Eggleston. He says that:3.

Speculation became the easiest and surest thing imaginable. The speculator saw no risks of loss. Every article of merchandise rose in value every day, and to buy anything this week and sell it next was to make an enormous profit quite as a matter of course.

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1. A. C. Gordon, "Hard Times in the Confederacy"
 "Cent. Articles"-V. 4--Sept. 1888--P.765
2. Schwab, "Confederate States", Pg. 229
3. Eggleston, "Rebels Recollections", Pg. 81
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We can readily see then how this enormous rise in price resulted in the impoverishment and starvation of the people, especially the wage earners for¹ wages and salaries responded but slowly and imperfectly to the inflating influence of the redundant currency, and their nominal rise was far outstripped by the rise in the price of commodities". The reader therefore realizes what a prominent part the excessive issue of paper money played in the collapse of the Confederacy. The condition described above caused people to lose whatever confidence and patriotism they had held. The same author, writing in another volume, emphasizes this point when he says that: 2.

The financial history of the Confederate States hinges on the wholesale issue of paper money and the consequent derangement of prices, which destroyed legitimate business, encouraged wild speculation, and, by undermining the industrial structure of the South, contributed in no small degree to the final downfall.

We may therefore conclude with the statement that the excessive inflation of paper money which was caused by the blockade, the lack of specie in the treasury, and the futility of taxation only to finance the war resulted in a decline in the value of money, a rise in the prices of all commodities, in speculation, in starvation among the people and army, and in the loss of confidence in the ability of the government to carry on the war—a factor which was very instrumental in precipitating the collapse of the confederate government. We should also remember that the collapse of the economic structure of the Confederacy under the conditions

1. Schwab, "Confederate States", P. 181

2. Schwab, "Cambridge Modern History, V. 7--Pg. 615

mentioned above was inevitable, and that the blame cannot, in all fairness, be placed upon Secretary Memminger and his associates. Let us now turn to the second and last of the financial and economic causes, namely, the Economic Inferiority of the South.

The problem, why the South was vastly inferior to the North, can be answered very easily. The reason lies in the fact that the South was an agricultural country. Using the words of Roland G. Usher, we may say that: 1.

It was due in the last analysis to cotton and to slavery, to the policy which had kept the South purely an agricultural country and which had regarded the development of diversified industry as needless. This was not the fault of any individual, but of the very system which the Confederacy was created to defend, and which thus, by a curious poetic justice, demonstrated its unfitness to survive.

The institution of slavery in the South also forced immigration from Europe to the North, leaving the South inferior both in resources and in the number of men available for the army. From a study of the statistics in Robert C. Wood's, "Confederate Handbook",² we learn that the number of men enrolled in the federal service was 2,778,304; while the number enrolled in the Confederate service was only 600,000--thus leaving the North with an excess of 2,178,304 men. As far as relative strength in battles goes, we learn from the same book that the North had more men in every important battle. 3.

R	Relative Strength in Battles	CONFEDERATE	FEDERALS
Seven days fight around Richmond	-----	80,835	115,249
Antietam	-----	35,255	87,164
Fredericksburg	-----	78,110	110,000
*Chancellorsville	-----	57,212	131,661
Gettysburg	-----	62,000	95,000
Chickamauga	-----	44,000	65,000
Wilderness	-----	63,981	141,160

2. Wood's Handbook, P. 29

3. P. 30

1. Roland G. Usher, "Rise of the Am. People", Pg. 325

Albert Bushnell Hart also gives us some statistics on this score.

Speaking of the relative number of fighting men, he say that: 1.

This leaves (in the South) 5,447,219 white persons of whom 1,064,193 were of military age, to carry on a struggle with 18,825,275 white persons in the North to whom it is fair to add 2,650,243 in the border states--thus including a military population of about 4,500,000.

Another author who comments on this phase is Stephen D. Lee, a lieutenant-General of the Confederate States of America. He tells us that: 2.

The official records show that the North had 2,600,000 men from first to last; after October, 1861, nevertheless than 800,000, and often exceeding 1,000,000 men. 1,050,000 men in round numbers were mustered out to the close of the war.

The Confederates, who, by the most reliable records and authority, had 600,000 from first to last, surrendered 150 150,000 men. The effective force in the field never exceeded 200,000 men at anyone time.

That this inferiority in number was the cause for the fact that many battles were lost and subsequesntly the collapse of the Confederacy cannot be doubted. Robert C. Wood states that: 3.

With all the data that could be secured from reliable sources, the claim can be safely made that the entire enrolled strength of the confederate army did not exceed 600,000 men, and that of this number, never more than two-thirds (400,000) men were even available for active duty in the field. The necessity of guarding a long line of exposed seacoast, of maintaining permanent garrisons at different posts on inland waters and at numerous other points deprived the Confederate armies in the field of an accession of strength which, in all probability, would have changed the result of important battles and campaigns.

James Ford Rhodes seems to hold the^{same} view--that this inferiority in numbers was one of the causes for the collapse of the Confederacy. 4.

1. A. B. Hart, "Why the South Was Defeated"

New Eng. Mag.:--V. 11--Nov. 1891--P. 374

2. S. D. Lee, "Why Confed. Failed", Cent. Mag. V. 53, Feb. 1897, P. 627

3. Rob't Wood, "Confed. Handbook", Pg. 29

4. James F. Rhodes, "Hist. of the Civil War", P. 287

With superior resources, larger armies as well disciplined as those of the South and better equipped and supplied, with generals equal on the whole in ability, as may be asserted after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the North was certain to win in the end provided it would with persistency and patience make the sacrifice of men and money necessary to subjugate the brave and high-spirited people of the Southern Confederacy, who were still determined on resistance.

The South was greatly inferior to the North not only in numbers, but also in military resources and transportation facilities--a fact which greatly reduced the fighting ability of the army and led to the loss of many a battle. All the writers on the subject emphasize the importance of this factor in the collapse of the Confederacy. John A. Campbell, formerly assistant Secretary of War, C.S.A., tells us that: 1.

The transportation was almost exhausted.----- In the same woful condition was the transportation by animals. The facts in regard to arms, ammunition, medical supplies, etc. disclose a similar condition of ruin.

Other authors express the same view. Roland G. Usher states that: 2.

Nothing was more serious than the effect upon transportation of the lack of iron, of machinery, and of skilled mechanics. ----- Locomotives broke down; parts of the equipment wore out and could not be replaced because either the material for duplicating the damaged parts was lacking or no man understood how to turn them out. Hence such supplies as there were could not be promptly and efficiently distributed. Often the food collected by government agents spoiled before it could be moved; leather, desperately needed in Virginia, had been collected in North Carolina but could not be shipped. This deficiency of transportation facilities was one of the greatest difficulties with which the Confederate government had to cope.

Albert Bushnell Hart also emphasizes this fact. He says: 3.

The limited military resources of the South were made less available because of the lack of sufficient internal transportation. The water-ways, both on the rivers and to the

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1. J. A. Campbell, Open Letter, -- "Describing the year 1864"
Cent. Mag. -- Oct. 1889 -- P. 951
 2. Roland G. Usher, "Rise of Am. People" -- P. 325
 3. A. B. Hart, "Why the South was Defeated"
New Eng. Mag.: Vol. 11 -- Nov. 1891 -- P. 369
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eastward, were early occupied or blockade by the North.-----.
The country therefore was thrown upon its railroads. These
roads were few, improperly built,-----, and they steadily
deteriorated.

At this point, we find an interesting account given by Ulysses
S. Grant concerning the results of the capture of a railroad.
This example is typical of the hardships imposed upon the confederate
army by the loss of its railroads. Speaking of the Weldon Railroad,
he says: 1.

This road was very important to the enemy. The limits
from which his supplies had been drawn were already very much
contracted, and I knew that he (Lee) must fight desperately
to protect it. Warren carried the road, though with heavy
loss on both sides. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge
Warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss.
As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached
him, troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the
Weldon Railroad; and with such success that the enemy had to
draw in wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the
supplies they got thereafter from that source.

Therefore, we may conclude that the inferiority of the South
in matters of military resources and transportation facilities
had much to do with its collapse. The South, however, was inferior
in another important aspect-----in fact the most important, namely,
economic development and wealth. Even the most superficial study of
this question will disclose the appalling poverty of the South in the
matter of economic development and wealth. James Schouler comments
on this point rather strongly when he says: 2

It is not easy to conceive how undeveloped, how dependent

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1. "Personal Memoirs" of U.S. Grant", --V. 2--p. 324
 2. James Schouler, "Hist. Of the U.S. of America", -V. 6--p. 316
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upon others, the economic system of these cotton States, prosperous though they seemed, had made them in 1861,-----.

Commerce, manufactures, skilled artisans, and the flood of white immigration from the Old World their people had willingly seen diverted to the North. The mineral wealth of coal, iron, and the precious metals in this section lay buried in the ground, and external capital had not been sought for this or any other development. Independence, in fact, was boldly invoked, while the South depended upon the outer world for most food products except hog and homing and for the commonest necessities of life--for beef and flour, for garments, coarse or fine, and for every implement of manufacture for peace or war.

We find the same view held by all writers on the subject. One author gives us a clear statistical account of this economic inferiority: 1.

The North far outstripped her adversary in manufacturing and railroad mileage. The South manufactured less than 3 per cent of her own cotton, and had only about 8000 miles of railroads as compared with 24,000 in the North. The total value of the Northern Manufactures in 1860 was \$1,730,330,000, as compared with \$155,000,000 in the South. The \$235,000,000 cotton crop dwindled away to some extent when compared with the \$845,000,000 corn and wheat crops in the North and North-West.

However, the most detailed, most vivid, most striking, and best account of the economic inferiority of the South is given by Albert Bushnell Hart. It indeed deserves to be quoted in full! he says: 2.

If the South were to win, then a numerical inferiority must be made up by a superiority of resources; but in wealth still more than in numbers the South had lagged behind. In the seceding states, 56,000,000 acres of land were improved, and the total value of farm lands was \$ 1,850,000,000. In the North and the border states the improved land was less than twice as great in area but its value was \$4,800,000,000, or more than two and a half times as much. Throughout the South, the tillage was primitive and rude and most of it was

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1. Hudson and Guernsey, "The United States," p. 388

2. A. B. Hart, "Why the Confed. Was Defeated"

New Eng. Mag.--Vol. 11--Nov. 1891--P. 367-368

carried on by slave labor; in the North, machinery and improved processes made it possible to raise a larger crop in proportion to the laborers employed. Manufactures of every kind were wofully deficient in the South. In a region including the enormous coal and iron beds of Alabama, and Georgia, one of the richest deposits on the face of the earth, there was but one large blast furnace and ten rail mills. To manufacture its great staple, cotton, the south had but 150 factories, against more than 900 in the North, and the value of the manufactured fabric of the South was but \$8,000,000, in the total of \$115,000,000. Of the 1260 woollen factories of the country, 78 were in the South. The manufacture of clothing, an essential industry when war is going on, employed, in 1860, less than 2,000 persons in the southern states, and nearly 100,000 in the north. Of boots and shoes, the South furnished but three per cent of the product. Well did the Lynchburg "Virginian" say: "Dependent upon Europe and the North for almost every yard of cloth, and every coat and boot and hat that we wear, for our axes, scythes, tubs, and buckets, in short, for everything except our bread and meat, it must occur to the South that if our relations with the North are ever severed,--and how soon they may be none can know; may God forbid it long!--we should, in all the South, not be able to clothe ourselves; we could not fill our firesides, plough our fields, nor mow our meadows; in fact, we should be reduced to a state more abject than we are willing to look at even prospectively. And yet, all of these things staring us in the face, we shut our eyes and go in blindfold."

That this inferiority in economic development and wealth was an important factor in the downfall of the Confederacy cannot be doubted. Stephen D. Lee, formerly a lieutenant-General of the Confederate States of America says: 1.

I am one of those who, like my great namesake, said: "I will not speculate on the causes of the failure, as I have seen abundant causes for it in the tremendous odds brought against us; the South was overpowered by the superior numbers and resources of the North." If we compare the two part of the country, we find the North outnumbering the South four to one in arms--bearing population, incomparably better prepared for war, having an organized government, an organized army and navy, with arsenals, dockyards, and machine shops, and

1. S. D. Lee, "Why the Confed. Failed",
Cent. Mag.--Vol. 53--Feb. 1897--p. 627

having free intercourse with the world from which to get supplies and men; while every port was sealed against help from the outside world to the Confederacy, which had to organize its government and improvise everything for the unequal struggle from an agricultural population.

Roland G. Usher also stresses this point: 1.

The physical and economic preponderance of the North over the South--two and one-half times as many fighting men, eleven times the productivity--could not fail ultimately to decide the issue, should the South be unable to beat the Northern armies or to obtain assistance from Europe.

Don Carlos Buell is another of the numerous authors stressing this point. He says: 2.

We find it completely shut in from foreign intercourse; we find it relatively deficient in men and money and resources of every sort, in military equipment, in facilities for interior communication, in mechanical appliances, in mechanical skill which so much aided the armies of its adversary, in that material development which occupies so important a place in modern civilization, in foreign confidence and sympathy, in internal confidence as well, and in that profound popular impulse which continually strengthened the armies of its opponent, and threw the whole energy of the North into the contest.

Albert Bushnell Hart states that: 3.

The military collapse of the Confederacy was not the result of happy accident, nor of overpowering generalship; it was caused by the steady, unremitting pressure of an adversary superior in forces, in resources, and in morale.

He brings this point out all the more forcefully two pages later when he says: 4.

All comparisons of area and even of geographical advantages are subordinate to the question of the economic resources of the two sections,--in men, in wealth, in courage, in military resources, and in means of communication. And here we reach that disadvantage of the South, to which its conquest must be chiefly attributed.

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1. R. G. Usher, "Rise of Am. People", p. 317
 2. Don C. Buell--Major-General, U.S.V., "Why the Confed. Failed".
Cent. Mag.--V. 53--Feb. 1897--p. 631
 3. A.B. Hart, "Why the South Was Defeated",
New Eng. Mag.--V. 11--Nov. 1891--P. 364
 4. Hart, "Why the South Was Defeated"
New Eng. Mag.--V. 11--Nov. 1891--P. 366.
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Therefore, I believe that after a carefully study of all the material presented here, the reader cannot possibly entertain any doubt as to the importance of this factor in helping to precipitate the catastrophe of 1865. The South being as it was inferior in the number of fighting men, military resources, transportation facilities, economic development and wealth , could never by itself have successfully resisted the North. It is much more surprising that the South under those conditions did resist the North as long as it did, than that it failed to succeed. Thus, we conclude our dissertation on the "financial and economic causes" and go on to the "social and psychological causes".

CAUSES FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONFEDERACYChapter IVSOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSESCONCLUSION

We now come to the last group of causes which aided in the collapse of the Confederacy, namely, the social or as some would call it the psychological causes. Since this book is being written in the year 1931, and since psychology is in such vogue, I presume it would not be out of place to give this feature a chapter by itself-- even though we can easily wedge these causes in among those described in the preceding chapters. The two important psychological causes which led to the catastrophe of 1865 were the loss of "morale" among the soldiers and the loss of "morale" among the people. I emphasize these factors, although some writers might relegate them to a minor position, because I believe that no government can successfully carry out a war unless it has the wholehearted support of a large portion of its people. It is true that most of the southerners entered the war wholeheartedly, but it very quickly waned. The conditions which they had to face, and the obstacles which they had to overcome were too much for any people.

As time went on, their hope for foreign aid slowly faded away; they realized that they were fighting with their back to the

wall against a much stronger and heavier adversary. As time went on, they saw a new and horrible monster in the form of internal dissension rear its ugly head and sprout discontent and disorder in their very midst--a condition which tended to break the backbone and spirit of the strongest. They felt themselves being slowly strangled to death by the vise-like grip of still another horrible sea-monster, the naval blockade. All about them, people saw soldiers--starved and tattered--with no visible means of aid; men who had marched on bravely into the very mouth of the roaring enemy cannon while their feet bled and their stomachs howled out for food--to fight for a cause. On every dark and grim battle field, people saw bodies of their beloved ones strewn here and there; soldiers who had left the comforts of their homes, their wives, their children to fight for a principle--only to lose all that they had lived for. Many a mother with tears in her eyes answered the queries of the little ones concerning their "dear old daddy" by saying that he had gone to heaven. Imagine the condition of the mother! What was left for her to do, now that her husband was dead, her children pitifully crying for food, prices rising sky high all about her, and what was most horrible, her purse empty? Is it a wonder that the spirit of the people was broken under this trying strain? Then again, deserters and marauders of both armies attacked the homes of the people. Imagine the sickening feeling of the people when they realized that the very soldiers, for whom they had deprived themselves of their very all to aid in the Southern cause, had turned about and instead of feeling grateful for what the people had done for them, were even robbing

and pillaging their homes. Imagine the feeling of the brave soldier who remained on the battlefield, who was forced to march even though his limbs were crying for rest, who was starved and tattered most of the time, and who knew that his dear ones at home were in danger from some of the very men he fought beside. The thought filled him with anger and disgust, and he began to lose confidence in a government that could not protect his family. The student who studies accounts concerning the sentiments of the soldier during this period will find many authors expressing this view. Ella Lonn who has made a very careful and exhaustive study of "Desertion during the Civil War" tells us that: 1.

A southern sergeant taken prisoner in April, 1865, voiced to a Union general very accurately the feeling of his comrades: "For six or eight months back, our men have deserted by thousands. Those who remain have been held by a sentiment of honor only. They did not wish to disgrace themselves by deserting their flag. They have done their duty to the best of their ability. As to the Southern Confederacy, although they would have liked to have seen it triumph, they lost all hope of it long since."

She also tells us on the same page that: 1.

Some mail bags captured by the U. S. officers showed already in 1863 that letters of Southern soldiers breathed but one sentiment--weariness of the war. Soldiers saw, despite desperate and heroic efforts, defeat everywhere, saw their toils and sufferings unproductive against apparently inexhaustible numbers.

General Grant is another of the authors who comments upon this topic. He says that: 2.

---After the fall of Petersburg-----the Confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. Their despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the battle of Sailor's Creek. They threw away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of reaching their homes.

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1. Ella Lonn, "Desertion during the Civil War", p. 18
 2. "Personal Memoirs, U. S. Grant"--V. 2--P. 499
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Now, let us see what the different authors say about the loss of morale among the people. Grant describes an incident depicting the suffering of the unprotected woman. Incidentally, the incident is rather humorous. A group of "bummers", that is, northern soldiers who would sally forth every morning to "bum" supplies for the army, once approached the home of an old woman, and proceeded to appropriate all her chickens. The woman pleaded with them saying that a group of mauraunders had recently taken away many of her chickens and that they were robbing her of her last bunch. Grant proceeds with the story by saying: 1.

The soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens again they were tempted and one of them replied:
 "The rebellion must be suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy," and proceeded to appropriate the last one.

Turning from the humorous to the pathetic, we find A. C. Gordon describing the sentiments of the people during Christmas. We of the North living in a period of peace and looking eagerly forward to Christmas as a period of joy, happiness, and gayety can hardly realize the bitter gloom that Christmas brought to the southerners. The author says: 2.

At no season of the year did the hard times draw so bitterly near the hearts of the adults as when the little homespun stockings hung about the chimney-place at Christmas, to await the coming of Santa Claus "through the lines". If he did not always bring bounteous profusion of gifts, the innocent fiction of his having been robbed by the armies on his way from the country of sleds and reindeers found many ready little believers, who, taking it for truth, yet did not really know how much of truth there was in it.

1. Grant, Idem P. 364

2. A. C. Gordon, --"Hard Times in the Confed."

Cent. Art. --V. 5--Cent. Mag.--Sept. 1888--P.770

Such were the conditions that the southerners labored under--conditions which inevitably led to the disintegration of the social life, the loss of morale of both the soldiers and people, and the downfall of the Confederacy. Speaking of the consequences of this loss of morale, Schwab states that: 1.

This lack of self-restraint and want of social discipline was also shown in the bread riots which broke out in some of the larger cities. Mobs broke into stores and demanded goods at the government's impressment prices, a curious commentary upon the effect of the policy of interfering with a free market. The Richmond Examiner claimed with reason that the mob "put into practice the principles of the Commissary Department." Vice and rowdiness became rampant. Ruffians, thieves, and prostitutes abounded, and vice in every form became common. The South from this point of view does not present an attractive picture, which is only matched by the description of the social conditions prevailing at the time of similar upheavals in other countries, for instance in France during the last decade of the eighteenth century.

It is needless to describe the results of this loss of morale; they are so apparent. Warren Lee Goss tells us that: 2.

When procuring luxuries of eggs or milk we paid the people at first in silver, and they gave us local scrip in change; but we found on attempting to pay it out again that they were rather reluctant to receive it, even at that early stage in Confederate finance, and much preferred Yankee silver or notes.

We see also that this loss of morale led not only to the disintegration of the social life of the people but was one of the causes for the disintegration of the entire economic structure of the south. Suffice it to say that the social and psychological causes described above--the loss of morale among the soldiers and people--were other factors tending to undermine the structure of

1. Schwab, "Confederate States", p. 282

2. Goss, "Recollections", Cent. Art.--V.1--Cent. Mag.--Mar. 1885--p.772

the Confederate Government.

We have at last arrived at the end of our journey. We have studied all the different types of causes, the political--the failure to obtain foreign aid, and the internal dissensions; the military--the naval blockade, the lack of supplies, desertion, and the inefficient organization of the army; the financial and economic--the inflation of paper money, and the economic inferiority of the South; and lastly, the social and psychological--the loss of morale among the soldiers, and the loss of morale among the people. The reader has also noticed that I have not attempted to limit my topic to a mere presentation of the causes which led to the collapse of the Confederacy; but instead, have attempted to limit my topic to a mere presentation of the causes which led to the collapse of the Confederacy; but instead, have attempted to present a detailed account of the causes for these "causes". It seems to me that an account of the causes for the collapse of the Southern government without a presentation of the causes of the "causes" would be only half the story--a very "unhistorical treatment".

Before I bring this book to a close, I wish to comment upon a point which I brought up in my introduction, but which may have escaped the attention of the reader. With the wrong attitude in mind, the reader cannot possibly derive any benefit whatsoever from this treatment; he should always keep in mind that all the causes mentioned in the foregoing pages are very very closely related, notwithstanding the fact that I have grouped them for the purpose of convenience into different and separate topics. In order to fully grasp this subject, the reader must always bear in mind that

each cause may be the cause or result of another cause, and that the entire structure of causes is one related unit. Let me present an illustration. The failure to obtain foreign aid which I have termed a political cause was the cause for the fact that the naval blockade, a military cause, was maintained. The North would never have been able to maintain the blockade effectively if the foreign powers had intervened. Then again, the lack of a Confederate Navy was another cause for the fact that the blockade was maintained. The blockade kept out supplies necessary for the continuance of the war on the part of the South, which fact caused much suffering among the soldiers and people. This fact in turn produced discontent, internal dissension, and desertion, which in itself broke down the morale of the soldiers and the people. I need not go any further, then, to point out the interrelation of these causes.

Another point that I wish to comment upon before I bring this treatise to a close is the fact that the grouping of the different causes into the major headings such as political and military has been merely arbitrary, and should not be taken as a dogmatic differentiation. Inasmuch as this assemblage of causes into different headings is purely the product of my own mind, and since no writer, as far as I know, has ever attempted to catalogue the different causes into different groupings; that is, since there is no standard, I ask the reader not to be too harsh with my groupings for I realize that one cause in one group may without deflection of the original meaning be placed in another group if viewed from a different angle. In other words, the grouping of the causes is a matter of opinion, and they may be rearranged--depending upon the point of view of the reader.

As a last and parting thought, let me remind the reader that I fully realize that this treatise is far from perfect. However, if I have only left with the reader the impression that I have undertaken this task cheerfully and wholeheartedly, have been honest and sincere in my procedure and presentation, and have produced a work befitting my ability, then I can truthfully say that my labor has not been in vain.

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* UPON THE RUINS OF THE CONFEDERACY ROSE THE UNITED STATES **
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1. The product of myoown mind.